The facts of right and wrong

without most footnotes

Summary. The article defends the stance of moral naturalism and claims: what ought to be, can be derived from what is. To be more specific, some existents, i.e. must-not-be-experiences - non-moral* desires of the non-prevalence of situations - and prohibitions and punishments, may plausibly be termed "ought-not-to-be:s" or "should-not-be:s". As prohibitions derive their "meaning" - their nature as attempts to prevent actions - from desires, it would seem superfluous to count prohibitions as independent constituents of injustices, should-not-be:s. Roughly the same applies to punishments. Desires of avoiding, on the other hand, may well be regarded as existing, real should-not-be:s - constituents of moral facts. The conclusion is: there are should-not-be:s and should-be:s, whose existence everyone must reasonably admit (to the same extent that everyone must reasonably admit the existence of other beings' experiences in general) = everyone must reasonably admit true, that some things should (not) be. This leads to the further conclusion, that a situation may have to be admitted by all to be both wrong and requisite. Towards the end of the article, a prioritization system of must-be:s and must-not-be:s, based on degrees of experienced urgency (=factual importance) or difficulty of ignoring the respective desires, is proposed. -Suffering is found to be inherently prescriptive (cf. Mackie, 1977), as it cannot be separated from a desire to annihilate it.

*desires not motivated by moral beliefs

One of the most widely known sentences in moral philosophy is the thought of David Hume, the so-called Hume's guillotine: thereof, what is, cannot be derived, what should (or shouldn't) be. This can be construed to mean, narrowly: from the fact, that people generally act in a certain way, cannot be deduced, that they act rightly. This I do not want to deny.

   In the following, my aim is to disprove Hume's guillotine (as far as I know, in a novel way) in its absolute meaning: from nothing, that is, can be derived, what should (not) be. So, my view is: it can be inferred from how certain things are, how things should (not) be. More specifically: some states of affairs, which all "sensorily healthy" people can perceive ("natural" states of affairs), may be called should-be:s and should-not-be:s. This I end up with in discussing, what we mean by "should be" and (particularly) "should not be" - how we use these expressions.

   So, I defend moral naturalism in this sense: (1) moral sentences, which look like claims are, in fact, claims (not, e.g., just expressions of the speaker's desires) (2) some such claims are true (3) moral claims are made true by some opinion-independent traits of the world (4) the "rightness" and "wrongness" of actions and/or situations are certain action- and situation-related "natural states of affairs" = states of affairs, that are often classified as non-moral, not pure moral-value-beings, moral-value-properties, or relations to such. These states of affairs are also "natural" = perceivable by senses common to almost every human being or by introspection (or deducible from such perceptions), not by a special "moral sense" ("perceptions" of moral rightness and wrongness vary from one individual to the other, being "non-natural").

   -Naturalism (and naturalness) has several definitions, but my stance represents in any case objectivism - the idea, that there is a universal  (opinion-independent) truth about actions' and situations' wrongness, rightness and requiredness. (I don't talk about realism, as this word might bring to mind consciousness-independent moral facts, not only opinion-independent ones*.)  As I tie up wrongness and rightness with experiences, someone may ask, how my position differs from subjectivism in the broad sense: "moral claims are assertations about the speaker's or someone else's attitudes towards actions and/or their consequences", but I promise to make clear, in the end, where the difference from subjectivism lies.

   After having shown, that there are moral requirements "intrinsical to nature", I outline roughly, what they oblige us to - how we (factually!) should live.

   The question, which led me to the views stated below, is: are there, in spite of everything, correct and incorrect beliefs about moral rightness (requiredness) and wrongness. (My former position was the error theory*.) In order to answer this, we must define (1) right and wrong (2) universal truth. I will ponder on the meanings of "right" and "wrong" long, before being able to reach my solution. If you find this pondering uninteresting, you may try jumping right away to my Solution-chapter. Your chance of understanding it will, though, grow significantly, if you will first read about my distinction between should-not-be-experience and wrongness-judgment (History of should not, paragraph 1. - 6.).

   Most people probably agree with this much at least: "Situation X is wrong" can just as well be expressed: "Situation X should not prevail", "Situation X must not-prevail". Similarly, "right" means something, that is (should be) allowed to prevail and "required" something, that must prevail (like the realization of human rights and actions counted as duties). But where does "should-be-ness" and its "sisters" abide? Do they exist objectively or subjectively (in consciousnesses)? If I say: "X is wrong", do I mean: I want X to not prevail (I experience X, for instance, as intolerable)? To me it seems apparent, that I mean something more.

   In calling X "a moral wrongness" I mean: it is a fact (not just my feeling), that X should not prevail. As G.E. Moore already observed, it would be impossible to disagree on moral claims, if they were only assertations of the speakers' feelings or desires.

   Let's suppose, that A says to B: "Euthanasia is wrong". According to the subjectivist analysis, she means: "I experience it as intolerable, that someone practise euthanasia", "I want unconditionally, that euthanasia be not practised". Now we can assume, that both A and B construe A:s sentence in this way. (Doesn't "the word means" mean: "The majority of the users of the word understands the word thus-and-so"?) If so, the sentence "B thinks A:s wrongness-judgment incorrect" can only mean: B does not believe, that A experiences the practice of euthanasia (e.g.) intolerable. And usually - I should say - we don't mean this by "moral

disagreements". The typical argument in moral disagreements is not, I should think, "Do I not seem disapproving/detesting?".

   The structure of real-life moral argument insinuates, that our disagreements concern some kind of intrinsical or objective wrongness, badness (etc.) of actions (their consequences) - not the attitudes of the moral judges towards actions (consequences).

   People, who argue about an action's wrongness, mean by "moral wrongness", that the action in question should not, objectively or universally truly, be performed. If the "shalling-not-be" doesn't factually exist in (for example) experiencer-independent reality, this proves the assertation "The action is wrong" incorrect. It doesn't change the meaning of the sentence into "The action is disapproved/detested by Alice". (Likewise: if it could be shown, that the world isn't created by an immaterial, conscious being, the belief in the existence of God would be proven incorrect - "God" wouldn't cease to mean "world-creator spirit".) If one of the disputers meant (during the dispute), that an action was universally-truly wrong, it is still true, that she meant this. And words "mean" - do they not? - whatever a language user (or majority of language users) means by them - what she understands them to mean.

   To me, at least, it seems apparent: every person of normal intelligence (who doesn't suffer from value-blindness) means, by "morally wrong", something universally "shalling-not", unless philosophical studies have distorted her word sense. Moral arguments are one piece of evidence for this. Another is the fact, that individuals are sometimes uncertain about an action's or situation's rightness, plus the fact that they make efforts to achieve this certainty. (We do not only ask ourselves, whether a certain action causes something that we detest/dislike - like suffering - more than the abstaining from this action. We can also ask ourselves, what are the absolute nonvalues, that should be avoided.)

   To sum: I consider the subjectivist wrongness-definition ("moral claims are only reports about the speaker's moral sentiments") incorrect. As far as I can see, whoever speaks of "wrongness" understands herself to be speaking of an objective/universally true "shalling-not-be", not only of her own relation to the "wrong" something. (I support Mackie's error theory without the error, one could say.)

   Subjectivism is, of course, not the only alternative to objectivism. There is (was), for instance, emotivism. I find, though, that emotivism also can easily be shown as an incorrect position.

   Alfred Ayer (Sayer-McCord 1988) proposed, that sentences of the kind "theft is wrong" are expressions of feelings, like "Ow!" is an expression of pain, and therefore they lack truth-value. (The statement "I'm in pain" can be correct or incorrect, an expression of pain cannot. Here I won't discuss the function of moral sentences as a means of influencing others' actions, which Ayer also proposed.) In my opinion, this kind of interpretation is possible only, if we don't pay enough attention to the meaning of the expression "expression of emotion".

   As far as I can see, "expression of emotion" means something (a word, a noise, a gesture...) that the emotion almost forces one to make. According to this (attempt at) definition, the sentence ""That picture is horrible!" is indeed an expression of emotion. But it seems to be more than that. The sentence isn't: "How horrible!", but: "The picture is horrible (horribly ugly)!". To its structure, the sentence is a statement of ugliness in the outer world, and is it that only to its structure?

   When I see an ugly picture, I feel, that the ugliness abides in the picture. I don't experience, that the picture is "out there" and the ugliness "in here", in the experience of ugliness in my mind. They are both "out there" (not-me) and inseparable from each other. In our childhood we learn, that beauty "really" is in the beholder's eye, but our use of language reflects (I claim) our original experience. It seems natural to think, that by such sentences we have originally expressed (besides the emotion-expression function) naïvely realistic beliefs about the ugliness inherent in objects. If you will: beliefs, that have been caused by projecting our emotions to the outer world.

   My point is: even sentences, that express "projection-beliefs", are expressions of beliefs. They have a cognitive content, like "Object X has the perceiver-independent property 'ugliness' ", and therefore they are not only expressions of emotions = outbursts of emotions. So: if we express, by moral sentences, naïvely realistic "projection-beliefs" (about moral issues we argue, as if they had a judge-independent truth), we must consider moral sentences as genuine belief-expressions, not (merely) expressions of emotions.

   As a logical empiricist, Ayer could not have admitted, that projection-belief expressing sentences are meaningful statements - they are unverifiable, metaphysical sentences. But this doesn't justify the conclusion, that expressing emootions is their (only) function. If moral sentences express the value-projections of the speaker, even a logical empiricist must recognize them at least as expressions of pseudo-beliefs.

   Keeping my emotion-expression definition in mind: the sentence "That picture is horrible!" is undisputably (among other things) an expression of emotion. On the other hand, in the sentence "She thought it horrible", the word "horrible" cannot be an emotion-expression - it is a statement about an other person's emotion (and projection-belief, maybe). Similarly, if I ask myself: "Would it be wrong of me to participate in research about bacteriological weapons?", the word "wrong" cannot be an expression of emotion. Or what would it mean to say: "Would it be "Ow!" of me to participate in research...?". An what could emotivist argumentation for the wrongness of the research be - argumentation in favour of "Ow!"? If a sentence asks somehing, it isn't an expression of feeling - when we ask, we are uncertain of the badness, wrongness etc.  of an action. If a question, not an expression - if an expression, not a question.

   If we suppose, that the meaning of the word "wrong" is in a broad sense "emotive", emotion-pertaining, my question could be given the meaning: would research on bacteriological weapons have consequences, that I would find, e.g., horrible. And this would, of course, not be an emotivist, but a subjectivist interpretation. According to it, "wrong" refers to "what I find horrible".

   There are similar problems in prescriptivism - the view "Moral 'claims' and terms are recommendations meant as universally applicable". Again, my "claim" of the requiredness of action X might only be a prescription that I mean as universal, but what does the (often asked) question, whether an action is required, mean? Perhaps, whether an action is worth being recommended? But if so, the term "required" refers to something worth recommending (we don't merely use it to recommend).

   -Perhaps we do mean this by "right"/"required", also in assertations? Perhaps moral arguments are attempts at showing actions worth recommending and prohibiting (whatever we mean by "worth")?

   As a further challenge to non-cognitivist positions - positions that moral sentences don't express beliefs (but are language games) - one might ask: can a speaker be wrong in her impression, that she has a belief concerning the outer world? And does unverifiability of a "belief" make it not a belief, but a motive for a language game (an outbursting emotion, a desire to influence actions) or a reaction to a language game move (sympathy, a desire to obey)?

   Therefore I claim: in talking about moral wrongness or rightness we do refer to something, and not only our own emotions or desires. For my own part I know for certain: when I think about the wrongness of an action, a certain image springs to my mind: an image of a world-pervading, human being-independent non-allowing of the action - not only of the detestable traits of the action (its consequences) plus my own detestation.

   Even if you don't agree with my idea of the meaning of "wrong", I ask you to notice: in this paper I use the expression "moral wrongness" in the meaning "universally true shalling-not-be". Or, more specifically: categorical universally-true shalling-not-be. According to Kant's terminology, "hypothetical imperatives" are often universally true, but they are not considered moral assertations.

   An example of a hypothetical imperative could be: "Always boil eggs for 12 minutes, if you want to eat hard-boiled eggs". This can be considered another way to say: the boiling of eggs for 12 minutes is the sufficient condition of the eggs coagulating thoroughly. This may be a universally-true fact, but no universally-true duty concerning the boiling tiome follows from it. The imperative is morally meaningless.

   An example of categorical imperative could be: "Don't fish the seas empty, for even your grandchildren will want a well-balanced diet". This imperative is motivated by a desire, but it is categorical - unconditional (maybe in a non-Kantian way) - in that the listeners are not left any alternative concerning their actions. So, my intention is to discuss, whether there is any (in this sense) categorical, universally-true shalling-not-be.

The history of "should not"

So far I have said: an action or a situation is called "morally wrong", when it is believed a universal truth, that the action or situation should not be. What does it mean, then, that something "should not" be?

   I have often noticed, that it becomes easier to understand the meanings of expressions, if I ask myself: what can have made the expression useful. In this case: what kind of thing, that someone has come across, could have made her say (or exclaim, or groan): this should not be? (I mean generally, not only in moral contexts.)

   One obvious answer is: the experience, that something is intolerable. For example, losing a thing, without which we "cannot imagine ourselves to live" (our spouse, our extremities, the respect of society). Or "intolerable" suffering, like an intense pain. If I would, while in pain, care about self-expression, I might well express my experience like this: this shouldn't be, this must end. Below, I call this kind of experiences should-not-be experiences. These must be distinguished from injustice-judgments (should-not-be- judgments, should-not-be opinions).

   A should-not-be experience is morally neutral - it isn't (necessarily) conjoined with the view of the universal truth of the "shalling-not-be". A should-not-be experience is not a view at all, but a desire of something terrible ending. Injustice-judgments are often accompanied by ending-desires, but an ending-desire = should-not-be experience and an injustice-judgment are (in my notion system) different things.

   There can be an ending-desire without injustice-judgment - I can want my pain to end, but believe that it isn't wrong, because no human being has caused it/because a good and just God allows it to prevail. There can be injustice-judgment without ending-desire - I can believe that suffering is always wrong, but get vengeful satisfaction from the suffering of my malefactor.

   Someone may answer this by: "It is true, that we often "consider wrong" the satisfying of our revenge-desire. But you haven't shown, that our "injustice-judgment" is a genuine belief, not another desire. After all, we do often have desires, which conflict with each other!". This I admit.

   If the individual struggles with her revenge-desire, then the counterforce of the revenge-desire is even necessarily another desire. What else could motivate to struggle (or any action) than some desire, or will (chosen action plan) caused by a desire? I claim, though, that the other desire in question is motivated by the moral belief (so there is a moral belief distinguishable from the desirer). Desires to avoid injustice are not just desires among others. If I consider an action (e.g. sexual infidelity) wrong, I attempt to avoid it unconditionally - I strive to avoid the action even, if I have a "compellingly" strong desire to it.

   So, my "moral desire" is for me an overriding motive among desires, or: I am committed to always obey it. Moral views (of the kind "One must act thus") are not only desires, whose superior intensity makes the individual always act upon them, but the moral agent has decided to act, unconditionally, according to them - as far as I can see, because she believes, that their consequences "should be" more forcefully than (other) things she desires.  (More accurately, I think: when a moral agent believes, that a certain action is wrong, she decides to abstain from it, because she, as a child, has made the more general decision to always act rightly - because she wanted to be loved by her parents/God...)

   So I claim - to those, whose own introspection or the dispute-impossibility argument (by Moore) doesn't convince of this: "injustice-judgments" are genuine beliefs. Not desires, but partial motives of moral commitments. The distinction between injustice-judgments and should-not-be experiences = avoiding-desires is justified. (Even if all moral judgments were desires, I suppose everyone admits, that all desires are not moral judgments?)

   So, the sentence "X shouldn't be" can (in non-moral use) express the experience of the intolerability of X and desire that X end, the experience of the "necessity" of X ending*. (These are hardly separable from each other. An experience of intolerability can hardly prevail without a desire of ending, or a compelling desire of ending without the experience of intolerability.)

   The expression "should not" has another common non-moral meaning (group of meanings) as well. "You should not do X, Matthew" is a prohibition - an attempt to stop Matthew doing X.

   The passive mode of a prohibition - "X should not be done" - is used when meaning, that someone or something (the parents, the law/ruler/parliament, the rules of a game...) has prohibited doing X (and imposed a punishment for it). Even this use might have its roots in the experience of intolerability. If a person, who holds a power position, says, that one should not do X, meaning "I don't tolerate X being done", her subjects know that their lives will become difficult, if they disregard this experience of intolerability.

   -I admit it possible, that the prohibition is the older meaning of "should not". In any case, the experience of intolerability and desire of avoiding are psychologically primary - there wouldn't be prohibitions without them.

   When adopting a prohibition as a guiding principle, even the subject (employee, child...) thinks: I should not do X, meaning: Don't do X!, that is, she has a plan, an intention to avoid doing X.

   So far I have spoken of (according to one way of counting) three meaning groups of "should not be (done)", besides its use as a prohibition: "I want unconditionally, that it isn't done"/"I find it intolerable"; "It is prohibited/punished"; I intend not to do it". All of these include some kind of turning away from the injust thing (avoiding or ending, or a desire to do so).

   Does "shalling-not" have a fourth, strictly moral meaning? A quite distinctive meaning, not just an objectified (de-humanized) away-turning (as-if desire to demolish, desire of avoiding or prohibition)?

   My sense of language says: even moral speech of "shalling-not-be" expresses an away-turning. The expression "it is wrong" brings to my mind an image, where the world itself looks sternly at the unjust action, struggles to vomit the action/agent out of its insides and only achieves peace, when it is gone. (The world as if struggles and as if is appeased - I don't really consider the world an experiencing being.)

   As I don't have actual perceptions of the world's vomiting attempts, I dare to conclude, that I am objectifying a human away-turning.

   But can I really claim that I mean, by "shalling-not-be", something that the world strives to vomit out? If I would see the Earth open and a lava jet belch a man into outer space, would I nod in a convinced fashion: he has not lived justly? Hardly, I should say. Even if I perceived something, that I considered a certain sign of the Earth's disgust and intention to spew out the unlucky man, I would think: even the Earth is only one experiencing subject. Even the Earth's disgust is subjective - existing only in the Earth's consciousness - not a sign of the detestability inherent in the man himself.

   Closer to a perception of objective shalling-not-be would come the instance, that the Earth would spew out the man of its intention, but without feeling (still assuming, that I can e.g. telepathically perceive the Earth's mind contents). Would I be prepared to construe as an injustice this completely motive-less out-spewing? No - I would consider it morally indifferent (just like an involuntary physical event).

   I am ready to admit something a moral injustice only, if I perceive the Earth spewing out the man because it can see, that he has acted unjustly (I remind you: in my image the world or the Earth looks stern). And if so, the injustice isn't constituted by the Earth's emotions, but by something else, that the Earth knows about.

   It seems, after all, that by "injustice"/"shalling-not-be" I don't mean the Earth's/world's relation to things. Why did I, then, take it up? Because my image of "shalling-not" is my only clue to what I mean by "moral shalling-not-be". It seems that I mean by "moral shalling-not" something, that the world struggles to spew out (I cannot mean by expressions something that never enters my mind), but only as far as I don't analyze it too much.

   In principle I mean an objective shalling-not-be, but I can only imagine a shalling-not-be by imagining mind contents: ending-attempts and -desires. (By transferring them into the lifeless world - outside the minds of people, animals and gods - I try to make them non-mind-contents, non-subjective. It still seems like moral shalling-not-be is only (partially) objectified human shalling-not-be. This is the case at least, if my idea of injustice resembles that of most people. But maybe it doesn't?

   I dare to claim, that all images of injustice = shalling-not-be contain a direction: "This (injustice) away!". The image of injustice always contains an exiting-movement of the wrong (the intention of removal, the desire of removal...). Do we, then, mean this removal-motion, when we talk about shalling-not-be? Could some kind of away-movement be the objective (not objectified) shalling-not-be, that we are looking for? In other words: are there exiting-movements, that we would recognize as constituting objective shalling-not-be:s?

   I begin to discuss this by asking, what kinds of "exiting-movements" we are capable of observing. During my life I have observed (1) actual events of ending or moving away, that is: my sense perceptions of something exiting from somewhere. As actual exiting-events I also count images (including memories, hallucinations and dream images) of something exiting something (unless these images are conjoined with removing-desires or, in general, exiting-movements of other classes) (2a) my attempts or will exertions to remove something (motivated by desire of removal) (2b) my impressions of removing-attempts in others (other people flee from and extinguish fires or remove splinters from their fingers, like I do - I believe that others also move of their own intention and intention-motivating desires (3a) my desires of removing something (often motivated by an experience of intolerability) (3b) impressions of removing-desires in other people and animals (not unlike (2b)) or disgust/suffering, annexed to the desire of avoiding or demolishing the disgusting/painful (4) plans, decisions l. intentions (in the future, in certain situations) to attempt removing something (5) prohibitions (motivated by a desire to demolish or prevent from starting) (6) the punishability of actions.

   It seems like we wouldn't mean any of these things by "moral shalling-not-be".

(1) When something actually ends, the ending only happens, not should not happen. (More accurately: ending in itself isn't shalling-to-end. Construed in this way, I do accept Hume's guillotine.) Factual endings we find morally indifferent, not constituting moral injustice.

   (2), (4), (5), (6) When we come across an attempt of removing something, we ask ourselves, why the removed or attempted-to-remove "should not be". The same applies to removing-plans, prohibitions and punishments. We find none of these constitutive of moral shalling-not-be.

   (3) A desire to remove is, I admit, a motive to remove - we don't ask, why the desired-to-end must be ended (particularly not, if we are acquainted with the intolerability-experience annexed to it) - but not an objective motive, if "objective" means "experience-independently existing", "non-experiential". An objective motive would be something, that would be just like a desire, but not-experienced. And such things we cannot perceive. (Neither do we have impressions of such things - we are not inclined to interpret the movements of animals, plants or lifeless matter as motivated by non-experiential desires.)

   My point is: the only "exiting-movements", that we are capable of observing, are actual exitings and subjective making-to-exit inclinations (also prohibitions expressed by someone, that are motivated by a making-to-exit inclination). If we believe the shalling-not-be to be another kind of exiting-movement than these - more objective than desires and intentions, more normative than actual exitings - then we do not have perceptions of such things (or only exceptional individuals have). Therefore I dare to claim: the view of "objective shalling-not-be:s" is an objectification of desires, intentions or prohibitions.

   This can be stated more concisely: the wrong is something, which objectively has to not be. What does "has to" mean, if it doesn't express a desire (non-objective) or an injunction (morally irrelevant)?

   Above I indicated one possible answer: perhaps we do innately experience the ending-desire (or the terribleness, which causes the ending-desire) to abide in the outer world. (This would mean, that the idea of "objective injustice" would after all stem from our experiences. When growing up, we would only learn, that experiences are not to be trusted.) Perhaps we don't actively objectify our experience-contents, but learn to subjectify them, when coming across world views, that differ from our own. In the case of injustice-experiences we only, of some reason, do not learn this subjectification (in spite of running to opposite views). Perhaps this is because our moral educators emphatically stress the correctness of their own (in)justice-views? Perhaps the nature of moral injuctions as enablers of a tolerable life (and a life tout court) causes people to think it more important to propagate their  justice- and injustice-views than their views of style? (Even those are propagated with remarkable passion, I admit. And do we believe in our hearts, that there isn't one single truth about style questions?)

   Could this kind of projectivism be the correct explanation of our experience of the objectivity of injustice?

   As a child, I may well have believed, that the terribleness, that I observe, is located in the outer world. But terribleness isn't shalling-not-be. A desire to demolish could be called shalling-not-be ("that should not be" is an expression of the desire to demolish). But have I at some point believed, that the desire to demolish the wrong is located in the outer world (not God, either*)? This I cannot remember, although I remember a good part of my childhood since the age of three.

   But perhaps I have "projected" only some of the traits of my demolishing-desire onto the outer world? Perhaps I only see, in the outer world, a forceful intention to demolish the wrong, a movement towards demolishing the wrong? (What else do we, after all, observe in our desires? Well - perhaps the suffering, that motivates them.)

   If the "projected" striving-to-end is the only meaning of "morally wrong", I must interpret "morally wrong" in this way even in my adulthood - in so far as injustices exist, I must see an ending-attempt in the outer world. This is not a problem, since I just admitted, that my image of shalling-not-be is an image of a forceful struggle to vomit out the wrong.

   In spite of this, I offer another, alternative or complementary, explanation: ideas of desire-less shalling-not-be:s and shalling-be:s are generated by a linguistic confusion.

   Beside moral, general rights and wrongs, we talk about rightness and wrongness relative to achieving a certain goal - a right or wrong solution, mode of use etc. (the "hypothetical imperative" of Kant). If I am going to a concert at the stadium, the "right" route is one, that brings me to the stadium, preferably before the start of the concert. More pertinently in this context: a mother may teach her children: "One should do so and so" ("Only this is right") when meaning "Those who act differently, the society despises and ostracizes". Since almost everyone wants to avoid social seclusion, it seems unnecessary to specify: "...if you want to avoid social seclusion". Perhaps the idea of a generally applicable right and wrong has been caused by this kind of teachings?

   Let's consider, how a child learns the meaning of "should not do". The child's first contact with the expressions "should not" and "should" is certainly an injunction of the parents - after all, the earliest education is based on those - the "understanding" of which means, roughly, that the child obeys the injunction. (If disobedience is followed by a punishment, that the child wants to avoid, then the injunction is, for her, not a hypothetical imperative - she doesn't deliberate every time, whether to choose the punishment or the not-punishment.)

   The child learns to respond to injunctions by acting accordingly to them - since all injunctions

are always in force, by committing herself to action plans in line with them. The "meaning" of the injunction is, for her, essentially her intention to do what is told (surely also the thought content "the speaker wants me to act thus and so"). The injuction is an incentive to form a certain action plan, provided that the child believes herself to be punished for disobedience. (The willingness of the child to adopt the action plan is undoubtedly strengthened by the parents' convincing the child of the ugliness or painful consequences (for someone) of an action, or convincing her, that obedience of an injunction is God's will or otherwise admirable.)

   As the child now knows the "meanings" of injunctions, and she is taught, how one should act in life - without mention of the alternative of common contempt and social isolation - she "understands" the teachings: "Something expects of me an unconditional commitment to a certain course of action". And apparently this is not only the desire of her parents, as (1) the parents obey the same rules, whether they want to or not (2) the same rules are recognized everywhere in society.

   The child forms an image of an action instruction, that (itself) expects to be obeyed - a demand, that exists independently of human demanders and their desires. The "objectifying" of the demand is only the denying of subjects. Additionally: when striving to adopt (internalize) the demand of abstaining from an action, the child must imagine (at least) that the forbidden action is moving away from its object, and thus ending. Little by little the child will probably learn to think about the action only as annexed to a movement away.

   Perhaps this engenders the image of an action-demolishing intention in the outer world? Or the action-demolishing intention inherent in the action itself? (I am not saying, that the idea of a subject-less demand would suffice as a motive for a small child to obey the demand. I am only talking about the meaning of "objective shalling-not". Above I proposed some possible motives. -For an adult, the belief in "objective shalling-not" may well suffice as a triggering motive of not-doing, since she already has the "will", the intention, to always act rightly.)

   The child connects injunctions with unconditional expectations, because (I dare to generalize) her parents have presented their injunctions persistently, only easing off when the child obeys them - but she denies, that expectors be the sources of the guiding principles - after all, expectors, who announce themselves as sources, are nowhere to be seen. ("Because I say so" is surely, more often than not, a last resource and expression of fatigue.)

   So, I think: with moral "injustice" and "requiredness" we are only referring to the existence of a universal, always applicable acting instruction, which requires obedience of itself. (Or something, whereof the lifeless world requires obedience.) A user of language can, as observed, mean by her expressions only such a thing, that is in her mind at least part of the time.

   This definition may seem unsatisfactory. Even if there are, somewhere, as-if-demands independent of demanders, what about it? Why should we act according to them? Demands are moral only when motivated!

   It seems, that we have in our minds, after all, a not-yet-mentioned criterion of moral prohibitedness and requiredness: grounds. And what do we, in this context, mean by "grounds"? In which way does the objective non-prevailing demand follow from its reason? Logically, causally?

   Must the truth of a "should-not-be"-demand follow logically from its reason - or must the shalling-not-be follow from it logically (what would the "truth" of a demand be)? And what is a truth of a shalling-not-be?

   According to the correspondence theory of truth, a sentence is correct (true) only if it corresponds with a state of affairs, that prevails - existents (and their relations), that exist. According to this, a shalling-not-be can only be true, if some kind of a shalling-be exists - maybe a demand, that is "objective" = given by a non-human, mindless being (not tied to a human desire). Now: the truth of shalling-not-be - the existence of a should-not-be demand - can only be inferred from something (a feature of the "unjust" action/situation?), that contains a "should-not-be" demand. (Logical proofs are tautologies - e.g. Wittgenstein 1997.)

   Philippa Foot (1958/2010) has proposed, that several non-value-natured components could together form a value, but for my part I cannot see, what we would consider components of a demand, if not a desire, its expression and and the intention of affecting others' actions.) But is this the kind of grounds, that we want for non-prevailing-demands? Do we, by "grounds for the prohibition of an action", mean the proof, that the prohibition exists? I believe: even in the case, that I would know the (perhaps objective) demand to exist, I would want the demand to have grounds, before I would recognize it as a moral demand. Do we not rather mean, by "grounds", a proof thereof, that the action should be or would be good to prohibit?

   I claim: in everyday moral reasonings we accept as grounds for prohibiting an action only, that the action leads to a bad consequence - something, that we experience aas terrible, like another person's pain or the ugliness of the world. If an action causes - or is intended to cause - more bad than good, most people admit without further questions, that the action should not be exerted.

   Badness is not a logical reason of shalling-not-be, nor goodness the logical reason for requiredness (at least in an obvious way), but it is a commonly accepted reason. (This is obviously analogical with the connection, that pleasure and pain have with desires. Since I find that a mango tastes better than a lemon, I want to eat a mango rather than a lemon.) We consider the bad consequences of an action to be grounds for avoiding the action.

   Maybe we would, then, recognize an action as morally wrong provided, that the non-experiential terribleness of a situation consequent to the action would lead to the non-experiential desire (or stopping-attempt) of the world, that the situation cease to prevail - similarly, like the experiences of intolerability lead to the ending-desires of situations? This would be a causal consequence, not a logical one - at least on the face of it.

   Would we recognize this as the groundedness (motivatedness), that we are looking for? Or even something less - the degree of non-experiential terribleness of an action's consequence, which would make it deserve our ending-desire more than the consequences of alternative actions? Or a subjective terribleness (painfulness?), that the world perceives correctly (the perception content being "objective" = like its object), and which leads to the non-experiential ending-"desire" of the world?

   I am tempted to ask, why we want grounds for the objective shalling-not-be:s of situations in the first place. Perhaps in order to be convinced, that they are shalling-not-be:s? But the truth of a shalling-not-be claim doesn't need other proofs than the existence of the shalling-not-be (for instance, desire that a situation not prevail).

   Could objective injustice in the here described sense - possibly non-experiential terribleness, that possibly leads to non-experiential desires - exist? Many a materialist would perhaps defend the stance: for every possible experience-content it is logically possible to exist also as non-experiential. Equally well, that one can imagine a non-experiential dimensional shape (of a physical body), one can imagine a non-experiential desire (or an "experience" of an ending-necessity or terribleness). Or equally badly: even a non-experiential shape cannot be imagined. Like Berkeley remarked, every imagined "non-experiential tree" is an image of a tree, an experience.

   On the other hand: even though a non-experiential (non-phenomenal) tree or other material body cannot be imagined, it can be thought of. One can think of an existent, which is characterized by (1) the shape and colour of a seen tree (2) non-phenomenality in itself (the existent may cause sensations, but is not one). Non-experiential desires and terriblenesses are thinkable in the same sense. But on the other (third?) hand: even if non-experiential desires or terriblenesses do exist, they are of no help in real-life moral dilemmas - we cannot observe them or infer their presence. The world deserves better!

  

The solution

The world may not contain observable entities or relations, that correspond exactly with our images of shalling-not-be - demands or desires, that are motivated by non-experiential terribleness, and/or are in themselves non-experiential (assuming, that our images are like this). If they did exist, I am sure children would learn them at school beside the multiplication tables. But perhaps there is something in the world, that we would be ready to call objective or factual shalling-not-be?

   As I have said, objective =  (1) experience-independent, non-experiential shalling-not-be:s cannot be observed by us. But why should injustice be independent of experiences? Isn't it enough, that it is a fact, that no one can reasonably deny - a view-independent fact?

   After all, the word "objective" is often used in this sense as well - of things, whose (2) observability/admittedness doesn't depend on the differences of ("normal") subjects.

   Experiences are subjective according to definition (1), but they are admitted to exist by almost everyone - even the experiences of others. At least: if other people's and animals' experiences don't exist, most part of morals becomes unneeded (all prohibitions, except those of (to God) despicable actions, like sex with a facade of an animal or the perpetrator's mother?).

   The majority of moral decisions are in any case made based on the uncertain belief, that there are experiences of suffering, pleasure and contentedness, and those not only in the decision-maker's consciousness. Why could we not ground the moral norms themselves on the knowledge/faith concerning experiences? (I speak hypothetically, as I haven't yet shown, that this would be motivated.)

   I suggest, that we content ourselves with the demand: moral shalling-not-be:s must be facts admitted by everyone (admitted when making practical decisions, if not when philosophizing).

   Now: what does "fact" or "truth" mean? I still vouch for the correspondence theory: a sentence or a belief can be correct (true) or incorrect (false) only by corresponding  or conflicting with what is. That a state of affairs should not prevail, can be true (or false) only if there is something (at least imaginable), that we would admit as shalling-not-prevail. So we must ask: is there in "wrong" situations something, that we would be ready to call the "shalling-not" itself?

   Hume's guillotine, or rather: the strong interpretation of the guillotine, denies this. In "A Treatise of Human Nature" [1740] Hume opposed the ethicists, that he knew, in some way like this (a translation from Finnish - sorry): "I want to add to these conclusions an observation, that might be to some degree important. In every moral system, which I have hitherto come across, I have observed that the writer begins by usual inferences, where the subject and the predicate are combined with the words is and is not - by postulating the existence of God or making observations of human affairs - when suddenly I notice, that I cannot find any proposition, whose parts are not connected by the words should or should not. The transition is subtle, but extremely important. Since this should or should not expresses some new relation or proposition, it should necessarily be noticed and explained. Explained should also be the circumstance, that seems incomprehensible: how this new relation can be inferred from other relations of quite a different nature. But as writers generally don't take this precaution, I take it as my right to recommend it to readers. I am sure, that this small attention disproves all customary moral systems and proves, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason."

   If the passage is studied by itself, Hume may seem to speak moderately - he says only, that it seems incomprehensible, how a relation can be inferred from relations of another nature; that the distinction between vice and virtue is not perceived by reason (not, that it isn't perceivable by reason in theory).

   Even the passage "disproves all customary moral systems and proves, that the distinction between vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects" could be interpreted weakly: in the moral texts, that Hume knows, the ethicists have not ended up with their "virtue"- and "vice"-labels solely on the basis of the relations of objects, that they mention; the reasonings in favour of the moral systems, that he knows, are disproved as insufficient.

   On the other hand, the text that precedes the "guillotine-passage" seems to show, that the right interpretation is stronger than this: goodness/badness/shalling-do cannot even in theory be inferred logically from the relations of objects, or from what is. Hume asks, namely, whether the vice factually inheres in objects - for instance, whether some of the things pertaining to a murder is the vice (vice being, vice relation) itself - and answers negatively. Therefore I believe, that the common, strong interpretation - "values cannot be derived from facts" - is justified (represents Hume's view correctly).

   Unanswered is still the question, what Hume or later guillotinists recognize as "objects", "existing" or "facts". Moore's talk about "natural properties" or "describing terms" doesn't make this clearer. Like Philippa Foot observes, "good" is a describing term in the common sense of "describing".

   In "Treatise" Hume gives a clue to this: he says, that we perceive the vicefulness of an action by our own disapproval: "Here we have a fact, but it is an object of sentiment, not reason; inherent not in the object, but in ourselves". Hume seems to think, that nothing but the moral judge's sentiment can constitute vice or injustice. If I am right, it doesn't make any difference, whether he would in principle have recognized (e.g.) the suffering of a victim of injustice as an "object". The guillotine can be made more explicit: badness, vice etc. cannot be inferred logically from anything else that exists than the moral judge's sentiment (which doesn't make the action bad in a generally applicable, factual way?).

   Additionally Hume seems to think, that the moral judge doesn't infer badness even from her own sentiment ("not an object of reason"), whatever this means* (note in end of this chapter) - she just feels it. If I am right, we are justified in ascribing to Hume a still more general claim: "Goodness/badness/shalling-be cannot be inferred logically from anything, that exists in any way (in or out of consciousnesses)".

   My aim here is to discuss the truth of the guillotine in a narrower sense than this: moral norms (shalling-be, shalling-not-be) cannot be inferred logically from any existing things. Interpreted in this way, the necessary truth-condition of the guillotine is: the prevalence of the state of affairs X is never the shalling-be of a state of affairs (X, Y or Z). If the existence of an entity would be an(other) entity's shalling-be, the latter could unproblematically be "inferred" from the earlier. If Hume wanted to deny this possibility - held impossible the inferring of shalling-be from what is, because being cannot be equated with shalling-be, we could counter him by adapting Foot: the claim, that being is never shalling-be, is obviously true only if we have decided in advance, that we would call nothing existing "shalling-be".

   Also worth investigating is, what we mean by "shalling-be". If we don't recognize anything imaginable as "shalling-be", the guillotine is not true but meaningless. But perhaps Hume gave it a meaning in his mind?

   We know, that by "vice" Hume meant "disapproved-of". Let's suppose, that he reasoned: similarly, like the word "good" only expresses the experience of pleasure of the speaker, the expression "shall be/do" is only an expression of a desire or a demand. (For my part, I would perhaps not call either an expression of sentiment, but let's suppose that Hume would - I see no other way to find a meaning for the guillotine.) A demand doesn't express a fact, so it cannot be a result of reasoning; the speaker ends up with her desire by inner inclination, not by reasoning. Ergo: "shalling-be-beliefs" viz. desires or demands cannot be inferred from being-beliefs. (Or: only that kind of reasoning, that seems to show, that a certain action leads to a situation, that the moral judge desires, can make her desire the action l. end up with a "the action must be performed-belief". Absolute values cannot be inferred logically from being-beliefs.)

   In this way, the sentence "no shalling-be from being" would acquire the sense: subjective desires or human demands cannot be inferred from beliefs concerning what is.

   The sentence "no shalling-be from being" is meaningful and true on these conditions: in moral contexts, we use, and are justified to use, the expression "should be" only as an expression of a desire or a demand. We are not to call anything existing "shalling-be" - otherwise we would have to infer shalling-be from being. The expression "should be" is not allowed to be even a statement of the desire of the speaker. It can only be an almost-groan engendered by a compelling desire - or a demand, an attempt to make others fulfil the speaker's desire. -I admit, that Hume didn't explicitly define "shalling-be" in this way.

   I rephrase my earlier question: is there (does there exist) something, that we would be ready and justified to call shalling-be or shalling-not-be? My answer is affirmative.

   If we ignore the hard-to-understand moral expressions and the hypothetical imperative, there remains (as far as I can see) five observable things, that we express with the word trio "should not be/do": (1) the prohibition (2) the prohibitedness (by someone/thing else than the speaker) (3) the punishability of an action (4) the should-not-be experience (an experience of intolerability conjoined with the desire that the intolerable end) (5) the will, that the action is not performed = a somewhat stable intention to refrain from an action and/or try to stop others from performing an action/causing certain consequences. Therefore I think: a prohibition, a punishment, an ending-desire (also of others than the speaker) and intention to refrain or to stop - each directed at an action or a situation - can well be called shalling-not-be of an action or a situation.

   A possible counter is, that in normal use of language we never talk about the state of affairs (or being) of "shalling-not-be". In normal use of language it is only said, that something should not be (done) - and this is only an expression of the speaker's desire (not a statement, that the speaker's desire exists, either).

   I defend myself: we don't use the expression "should not be (done)" only as an expression of our desires. (1) Punishments or prohibitedness by law, whose existence the expression "should not be done" refers to, are clearly not desires of the speaker. (2) In moral language, "should not be" refers specifically to a "shalling-not-be" outside the speaker - an objective demand (or the like), that the speaker believes in. If the parties of moral arguments would talk (understand themselves to talk) only of their own wishes, moral arguments would be impossible. Our use

of language contains, after all, an idea of a state of affairs or being of shalling-not - an existing (as if-)demand, that constitutes the state of affairs "X should not be". Therefore I consider it justified to (at least) ask, if there is any shalling-not-be.

   If something existing corresponds with our ideas/images of what "shalling-not-be" means, we are justified in claiming, that there is a shalling-not-be (injustice). So what do we understand that "shall-not-be" means or expresses? I answer: 1. A prohibition 2. prohibitedness 3. punishability 4. a should-not-be experience and (maybe) 5. the will/intention to avoid an action. These are namely the only meanings, in which we use the expression "should not be". Or, more accurately: they are the only original, non-objectified meanings, and the objectified (moral) meaning necessarily resembles them. So I think: a prohibition, a punishment and a should-not-be-experience can be held as existing shalling-not-be:s. (Further on, I make yet another attempt to show, that this isn't autocratic use of language.) A state of affairs or an action, towards which a prohibition, a punishment or a should-not-be experience is directed, has thus to be considered as factually shalling-not be. A claim is true, if it represents correctly something existing.

   Let's now consider the different candidates closer. First: does the expression "should not do" intended as a prohibition refer to factual shalling-not-do:s? A prohibition is an attempt to stop others doing something. The expression "should not" intended as a prohibition is only a pawn in a language game - it doesn't refer to anything existing. So, the prohibiting "should not" lacks truth-value (wherefore it cannot be true).

   The expression "should not do" is also used in a second order meaning - meaning, that something is prohibited - by a parent, a ruler, the law, God - that is, there is a prohibition (or the prohibition has at some time been proposed and is meant to be still in force). Prohibiting sentences don't refer to anything existing, but sentences that state the existence of prohibitions do - the prohibitions (and punishments) themselves could be called existing shalling-not-be:s. But does this make prohibitedness a moral fact? Does it create an indisputable duty to avoid performing an action or causing a consequence?

   Above I said, that we only consider prohibitions and demands moral, if they are motivated. It is easy to see, that a prohibition in itself does not contain its reason.

   Another counterargument for a prohibition's nature as moral fact is this. A prohibition is only an attempt to stop others performing an action. I mean: the "meaning"- language-game-pawn -ness, of a prohibition is caused by the attempt to control. (Could the reciting of the song "Don't speak" be considered a prohibition?)

   An attempt to influence cannot exist without the desire to influence - or the will (intention) to influence, but even the will is caused by a desire (e.g. the will to go to work five days a week by a desire to gain one's livelihood).

   As there is no prohibition without a desire (at least a has-been desire, in the case of recorded prohibitions), is it needful to bring other shalling-not-be:s beside desires?

   I suggest, that we deny the access among moral facts from prohibitions and prohibitedness. But what should we say about punishments? Must the punishability of an action be considered as its factual shalling-not-be? In a certain sense it is undisputably so. We say "it should not be done" meaning (sometimes), that "it" is punished. Could we say of a punishment the same as of a prohibition: we consider it moral only if it is motivated? No - the punishment is a reason for avoiding the action!

   One can say so. A punishment is, though, a reason for avoiding an action (or reason to avoid getting caught...) only for an agent, who wants to avoid the punishment. No desire, no avoiding-reason.

   There is another reason to ask, whether the punishment in itself is a "factual shalling-not-do". We use the expressions "should not be" and "must refrain" in contexts, where something directs "compellingly" towards avoiding the action in question. The punishment would not direct people to avoid the action, if it weren't for the punishment-avoiding desire of the potential agents. Even here, the desire is the ultimate creator of "shalling-not-do". Why engage in double bookkeeping?

   Fourth: could the refraining-wills of individuals - refraining-intentions that are "in force" as a result of decisions - be considered as shalling-not-do:s? (If intentions are always caused by desires, clearly not as independently existing shalling-not-do:s.)

   The sentence "I should not do so and so" is a prohibition directed at the speaker herself. "I should not..." is an attempt to strengthen the commitment to an action-plan and thus an expression of intention. But would we call our refraining-intention an existing shalling-not-do?

   Do we perhaps feel, that actions are shalling-not-be only through (consequence-avoiding)desires or through their moral injustice (things, that lead to our refraining-intention)? Are intentions only attempts to avoid, what is from the start shalling-not-be? I feel tempted to say: refraining-intentions themselves are at least not motivated shalling-not-be:s, contain their own reasons. Desires and injustice-views are their reasons.

   On the other hand, one might think: our refraining-decision makes us also desire avoiding an action (even though we would in the beginning only want to avoid the consequences). We want, because we will (intend). Therefore: insofar as desires are undisputable shalling-not-be:s, wills/intentions are never morally insignificant.

   How is it, then: can the should-not-be-experience (experience of intolerability and desire of ending the intolerable thing) be considered a factual and duty-creating should-not-be? My answer is affirmative. But before I motivate this, you may wish to know, how the idea of a should-not-be experience constituting injustice differs from subjectivism.

   According to (a certain kind of) subjectivism, one who speaks of an action's justice or injustice only means, that she has a positive or negative attitude towards the action. The justice is thus speaker-dependent, not universal. I for my part claim, that by our speech of moral "justice" and "injustice" we mean universal facts, but we are justified to admit (of all the things we can observe) as universally true only "should not be", "is allowed to be" and "must be"-experiences (as universally true( in)justices only states of affairs, towards which some of these desires are directed). Desires are something existing, that is: universal facts. Prohibitions, punishments and intentions are also that, but they only exist desire-dependently.

   The injustice = shalling-not-prevail = should-not-be experience may be located in only one consciousness, but exists admittedly-by-all, is a fact admitted by all. We think like this of others' experiences in general, as far as we can perceive signs of them. I emphasize: the suffering, that John experiences, is not "unjust for John". The injustice = shalling-not-be is located in John's consciousness, but the suffering is wrong l. shalling-not-be admittedly by

all (all who apply common sense), insofar as there are outsider-observable signs of the shalling-not-be, that John experiences. (Isn't everything factual located only somewhere?) Moral knowledge is objective in the sense "admitted by all", but it must be gained by observing subjects. The experiences of subjects are also its truth-conditions. -I admit, that this isn't the most familiar form of objectivism, and therefore we'd perhaps better give it its own name. I suggest "omnivoluntary objectivism".

   Is this kind of moral philosophy of any use in practical moral decisions? "Should-not-be experiences", "allowed-to-be experiences" and "must be -experiences" all exist equally. None of them is more real than the others. So, the same situation can be both right (even required) and wrong. This is logically unproblematic, since the requiredness and injustice exist in "different locations", but practically problematic.

   Morally only-right would only be the kind of situation, where no subject has an intolerability-experience and all "must be"-experiences are fulfilled. Interest-conflicts make this kind of situation hard to achieve, even hard to strive for. The changing of a situation intolerable to one subject may cause something intolerable for another. As an extreme example: we can think of a sadist, who suffers intolerably, if she cannot satisfy her compelling desire to torture a victim.

   A morally only-acceptable situation may (surprisingly?) only be an unattainable ideal, but at least we can pursue the rightest possible situation. Let's think about injustices, things toward which should-not-be experiences are directed. If there are (as it would seem) more and less compelling should-not-be experiences, the objects of the first mentioned are more wrong. In order to get an idea of what is most important to avoid and pursue, we must judge, what things are experienced most important. This is difficult and uncertain of results, but do we not anyway make our moral decisions based on this kind of judgments (knowledge or beliefs concerning priorities of the majority of humans or other animals)?

   I will yet return to the prioritizations of wrongs and rights. But now, again: can we consider a should-not-be experience of a situation the factual and duty-creating shalling-not-be of the situation? First: can we at all call the existence of a should-not-be experience (without linguistic autocracy) a shalling-not-be? I claim that we can.

   As an example we can think of the (plausibly) most compelling should-not-be experience: the experience of an individual, that her suffering (such as pain) is intolerable and has to cease, it must not be. A should-not-be experience can just as well be named an experience of ceasing-necessity.

   Now: what else could a "necessity to cease" mean than something resembling a compelling ceasing-desire - even in moral contexts? When we talk about a moral necessity for the ceasing

of an injustice, we clearly don't mean, that the injustice inevitably ends - ends of logical or physical necessity. The inevitable ending of X would not oblige us to make X end - it cannot be considered a demand to end. We mean (imagine) something like that the world strives for the ending of the injustice, without certain success - and does not merely idly pursue it, but screams for the ending of injustice and is appeased only when it has ended. (We feel that moral demands are compelling.)

   From where would we be acquainted with this kind of "scream", if not from suffering and compelling desire (or unconditional intention)? The mind of the sufferer screams for the ending of the suffering; a desire "towards" something screams for its satisfaction. (A mere intention to perform an action doesn't, at least to me, seem as a "compelling" directedness towards the action, and I am not tempted to call it "a scream for the action".)

   I find: if we can plausibly call the objective "screams of the world", that we imagine, "should-not-be:s", we can also call the similar (but "local", not world-pervading) should-not-be-experiences "should-not-be:s". -Someone may point out to me the obviousness of the fact, that we don't , by our speech of injustice, refer to prohibitions or punishments any more than an inevitable ending (and we don't consider them morally obliging). I defend myself: I have discussed prohibitions and punishments as potential "should-not-be":s, because they resemble obliging demands remarkably more than actual inevitably-endings.

   So, the "moral ending-necessities", that we imagine, are (I claim) non-experiential as-if-desires. Would we also acknowledge prohibitions and punishments (that exist "objectively" = observably by everyone) as moral ending-necessities? Even if we would, I claim that we experience also prohibitions and punishments as "necessities not to do" only thanks to desires. They force us to abstain from actions either thanks to the desire of the prohibitor, which becomes our own desire, or our originally-own punishment-avoiding desire. I would even say: we wouldn't recognize a prohibition as a prohibition (an attempt to stop), if we didn't see the desire "behind the prohibition". The prohibition is constituted by an attempt to stop the prohibited action; there is no attempt or striving without a desire. (In a possible soulless physical reality there is only happening and not-happening, not striving for happening.) We can recognize a prohibition, an attempt to the non-performing of an action, only where we observe a desire or (desire-engendered) will that the action be not performed.

   It seems, that the only thing, that makes us classify something as a situation's shalling-not-prevail, is the ending-desire directed at the situation - or a non-experiential as-if-desire. Therefore: if there is a desire of the non-prevalence of the situation, there exists a shalling-not-prevail of the situation. The shalling-not-prevail of the situation is a fact. It is even a motivated (and thus morally relevant?) fact: the ending-desire is a reason for demolishing the terrible. So is the experience of intolerability - badness-experience! - that engenders it. (Above I claimed, that badness is the only commonly acknowledged proof of injustice.)

   -Whether a should-not-be experience leads to a duty to end the shalling-not-be situation, I discuss later, in the chapter "Obligation".

   Once more: every should-not-be experience is an existing should-not-be - a should-not-be fact, that everyone must acknowledge. This can also be expressed in another way, with less violation of language. When experiencing intense pain, the sufferer feels, that the ending of her pain is unconditionally important, necessary. The moral judgment of the sufferer may be, that the pain is acceptable (that God would otherwise not condone it). But beside her moral judgment she has a lively experience of the pain-ending necessity. In the mind of the sufferer, there is an experience of the importance of the pain ending. So: the importance of the pain ending exists. (What else could "important" mean than experienced-as-important - or non-experientially as-if-experienced?) The ending-importance exists, is a fact.

   As a small rhetorical deviation: what could be more compellingly important than that, which is experienced as the most compellingly important: the relief from intolerable suffering, the satisfaction of a compelling desire? If a non-experiential as-if-intolerability experience and an as-if-ending-desire where directed at a situation, would the ending of it be more important than the ending of something experienced as terrible, painful (a pain-experience)?

   I still want to emphasize: a should-not-be-experience constitutes injustice, a should-not-be judgment (injustice-judgment) doesn't.

   A judgment, that says that a situation should not prevail, is a belief in the universally-true shalling-not-be. The belief is true only if there exists a shalling-not-be of the situation - necessarily something else than the should-not-be belief itself. If a belief refers to itself, we end up with an infinite regress: I believe, that there is a belief, that the situation should not prevail, that is: that there is a belief, that the situation should not prevail... What does "shalling-not prevail" mean in the end? -If all moral judgments are desires projected on the outer world, then all that is judged wrong is indeed wrong (and what is judged required is required), but again thanks to the avoiding-desire, not the moral belief. -It is possible, that a long-lived (from parents adopted?) belief in the injustice of a situation makes the situation also detestable to the injustice-judge, intolerable to her. In this kind of case the situation is - I cannot deny it - indeed wrong. I'll return later to the practical consequences of this.

* What would it mean, that we refuse to infer justice from our approval/acceptance/contentedness (even if our acceptance is the source of our justice-views)? Let's imagine, that my interlocutor talks (now) to me about a hypothetical situation H: I accept murder from any motive. If I don't (now) conclude, that murder is right in situation H, I refuse inferring justice from my acceptance. (If I would interpret "right" as meaning "accepted by me", I could not deny the rightness of murder in situation H.) In this case, wrongness would be to me "an object of reason". Maybe Hume thought: in order to be convinced of an action's injustice we must experience, that we perceive the injustice - perceive in the action something, that we experience as wrong - we are not satisfied by the knowledge, that we experience it as wrong.

Naturalism and badness, that doesn't accept itself

So far I have said: the injustice or requiredness of a situation is constituted by something that is related to the situation: the "should-not-be experience" = ending-desire or "must be -experience" = positive desire directed at a situation in a human, animal or divine mind. This can unproblematically be called moral objectivism (realism), insofar as the existence of desires is opinion-independent. But can moral naturalism in the sense of a kind of non-antinaturalism, be defended? Could the requiredness or injustice abide in natural = intrinsical properties of actions or situations - not in something, that is directed at them? (Requiredness or injustice inherent in the action/situation itself could also be called objective = in the object (action or situation) abiding requiredness or injustice, independently of its experientiality. This is, by the way, already the fourth here mentioned meaning of the word "objective".)

   John L. Mackie (1977) has pondered on the question in this vein (a translation from Finnish, italics mine): "The claim, that there are some kind of objective values or inherently prescriptive entities or properties, is in my opinion not senseless but false. Plato's ideas give us a dramatic idea of what objective values would necessarily be like. The knowledge of the idea of good gives the knower both an action-direction and an overriding motive. The knowledge, that something is good, tells the knower, that she should pursue it, and makes her actually pursue it. An objectively good thing would be pursued by anyone, to whom it was revealed. This isn't caused by any contingent fact, like that the perceiver or the human race is genetically programmed to want the good thing, but thereof, that the pursuing-admonition and pursuing-worthness are somehow contained in the thing. Similarly, if there were objective principles of justice and injustice, every (possible) wrong action would somehow contain its prohibition and ending-worthness. Alternatively we would have to imagine something like the fittingness-relations between situations and actions (proposed by Clarke), in which case a certain kind of situation would always contain the demand of a certain kind of action."

   If Mackie's definition is changed into a consequentialist one, concerning situations in stead of actions, there are (I claim) "inherently prescriptive entities". There are states of affairs/entities, that prohibit themselves from existing, and we have all perceived instances of these. Suffering always contains the desire, that the suffering be not (or at least end immediately).

   So far I have, for the sake of convenience, used the expression "suffering (intolerability-experience) that motivates an ending-desire". Actually I think, that suffering and ending-desire cannot be separated from each other. Or: there are ending-desires without suffering, but not suffering without ending-desire. (Would we call such an experience "suffering", whose subject finds it indifferent, whether it continues or not?) Every experience of suffering contains its "prohibition" = should-not-be experience.

   Mackie wrote: an objectively good thing would be pursued by anyone, to whom it was revealed. Reversely we could say: an objective injustice (consequentialistically: a wrong situation) would be avoided by anyone, who perceived it. As far as I can see, this also applies to suffering. One can perceive suffering only by feeling it (in others we only see signs of suffering). Everyone, who perceives = feels suffering, gets motivated to end it, if she can (unless she pursues something that she considers still more important by the aid of the suffering-inducing thing). Adapting Mackie: the knowledge of a bad thing gives the knower a motive to end it. (The motive isn't always overriding, but you can't have everything.)

   Every suffering-experience contains a suffering-"prohibition", desire that the suffering be not. Similarly: every situation-intolerability-experience (that is not suffering) contains a situation"prohibition", a desire that the situation prevail not. This can be considered a weaker case of "intrinsicality", as the prohibition is not contained in the situation itself. On the other hand: only an experienced situation, situation experience (which the subject perceives as an "outer world"-situation) can be experienced as intolerable. Thus it can be said, that a situation = situation experience contains the should-not-be experience. And expressly contains, I find (is not merely "related to" the should-not-be experience). We don't experience the intolerability here and the situation there, so I think we can say, that the situation-experience contains the intolerability-experience (or is characterized by intolerability).

   Positive "must be:s" are less applicable to the model. When there is a towards-directed desire, then the desired experience or situation is not yet. Thus the positive desire is not contained in the good itself, the desired experience or situation - only in an unsatisfactorily thin idea of it.

   But is this the only way to perceive it? I find, that one can plausibly describe a positive desire as a continuing-and-strengthening-desire of an experience (thought-content or sensation). If this is the case, then also positive desires are prescriptions contained in the experienced (good). The observed good (we can only perceive our own mind contents!) contains a demand of its continuing and strengthening.

   There are prescriptions inherent in bad (stop, vanish!) and inherent in good (continue, strengthen!). It even seems as though all prescriptions (desires) are inherent in good and bad. A desire cannot exist in itself, it has to have an object. The desire is always contained in an experience of the desired object (desired to attain or avoid).

   In other words: the requiredness and injustice are natural = intrinsical properties of situations = situation experiences. In this sense my stance can be regarded as moral naturalism. And also in the sense, that desires are properties/entities/relations perceivable by the "natural" introspection ability.

   In the (original?) introduction I proposed, that my stance is objectivist/realist (as naturalism is a subspecies of objectivism/realism) in the sense, that moral-fact constituents are independent of opinions. So, do desires and suffering (that contains an ending-desire) exist independently of their subject's opinions? Can the experience of the existence of one's own desire or suffering be called an opinion? If we mean by "opinion question" a question, that has several equally correct answers, most would probably say No. It is commonly held (is a common opinion?), that the subject is in a priviledged position to observe her own experiences. Whether I or someone else experiences suffering, is at least not commonly considered a question of opinion.

   Finally: in the introduction I proposed as the criterion of a moral position's naturalness (minimalistically), that the position claims that requiredness or injustice is reducible to other than pure moral value -properties. (At least this is a criterion for reductive naturalism. The naturalist Cornell realists vouch for - I admit - the idea of moral properties, that are natural = explanatorily potent in science, but not reducible to e.g. psychology.) So, are the ending- and continuing desires, which I consider constituents of the injustice and requiredness of situations, non-moral properties of situation-experiences? I think we can answer in the affirmative.

   We often talk about compelling desires - our own or those of others - without making moral claims. Normally we don't classify an experience, that something has to end, as a universally-true (=moral) ending-necessity. The avoiding- and attaining-desire turn (for us) into moral facts only (1) when we name them shalling-not-be:s and shalling-be:s - without talk of "experiences" (when we see that "shalling-not-be" and "shalling-be" only have an application when they refer to desires or as-if-desires) (2) when we notice their universally-true existence. Speech of desires is not in itself moral speech, so I think we can claim, that the "wrong" and the "right" in my position refer to the existence of something non-moral. My position can, then, be classified as naturalism (omnivoluntary naturalism?).

Obligation

As I have (ad nauseam) stated: there are shalling-not-be:s, ending-necessities (negative desires) and shalling-be:s, continuing-strengthening-necessities (positive desires). But does this lead to a duty-ethics? The experience of the sufferer says only that the suffering should not be, not that something must be done or refrained-from (that we have positive or negative duties).

   Let's discuss this: do we have obligations to (potential) sufferers?

   Since I am looking for moral facts, I can only appeal to facts: existing experiences.

   Everyone, who experiences suffering, feels that it should not be. We may plausibly continue: every sufferer feels, that the actions leading to her suffering, should not have been performed. There is an experience: suffering should not be caused - it is a fact, that suffering should not be caused. (For the sake of convenience, I talk of "suffering-causing actions", as if the actions were sufficient causes of the suffering.)

   But wait a minute: what if the sufferer doesn't know, how her suffering is caused? What if someone has secretly put anxiety-inducing chemicals in her coffee? What if the sufferer is an insect, that doesn't know, that it is painfully crushed by another agent? In such cases there is no "this suffering should not be caused"-experience. I call this problem 1. Problem 2 is: before a certain suffering-instance is caused, there is no desire for its not-being. (We don't live our lives thinking: "I don't want to suffer in any way", so that we could be considered to also want the not-being of the said suffering instance.) Yet my moral intuition says, that causing suffering is wrong. So, is there a shalling-not-be of suffering instance S before the existence of S?

   I'll try again. Every suffering-instance is shalling-not-be (contains its not-being desire). So, there should not be any suffering. If there is a future: any present or future suffering should not be. Let's suppose: if the action A is performed, suffering S is caused. Now: (1) S should not be (2) if A, then S, so (3) A should not be.

   The introduction of the deduction - "any present or future suffering should not be" - can also be considered a solution to problem 2. It applies to every suffering, even future, that it should not be. But is the inference (1), (2), (3) credible? If there is A, there is (soon) something that should not be, but is it true, that A should not be? In advance we only know, that S should not be (it contains a not-being desire). A is shalling-not-be only if A is S (+ something else) - only if A contains S). Logic doesn't make shalling-not-be (not-being-desire) stretch from S to something outside S. (Can shalling-not-be be separated from desire and remain a fact?)

   So, can we say that A contains S? If A is first and S is next, there is a moment with A and without S. A cannot be considered to contain S literally, like a whole contains its parts. (For practical reason it is enviably apparent: if suffering should not be, then suffering should not be caused.)

   On the other hand, A is causing suffering only thanks to that (and when) suffering comes into being. We can say, that causing suffering should never happen, because it contains suffering. But why should the action, before it becomes causing suffering, not happen?

   Someone may counter me: A and S are inseparable thanks to the causal relation (if A, then later S). S is always included in the temporally extensive A-S-package. The package contains S, so it should not be. But is even this true? Is the premiss (2) - "if A, then (always) S" - ever true, if A is an action possible to human beings? Does any kind of action (like theft or attempt at theft) always cause suffering? The potential victim can often defend herself or influence, whether she suffers from the caused situation. My experience tells me, that I can even rid my pain sensations of painfulness by directing my attention to something else (or by taking an analgesic).

   Would it be better to define suffering-causing counterfactually: if non-A, then non-S? A defense of negative duties adapted to this requires expressing desire positively: non-S must be. This is probably not a problem. I feel: my desire, that my present pain be not, can just as well be expressed "the pain must be absent" as "the pain should not be". The new formulation is: (4) in the future (also) non-S must prevail (5) if no cause of suffering (A1, A2 ... An), action-natured or not, then later non-S (6) there must prevail a situation with no suffering-cause (A1, A2 ... An). A situation with no suffering can (in this world) be realized only in the future and in a series of events, "entire package", whose beginning does not contain suffering-causes. So, if there should prevail a full suffering-lessness (at least in the future), then there must be an "entire package" without suffering-causes.

   Premiss (4) raises the question: if there must, in future, prevail a full absence of suffering, does the present situation non-A1 & A2 (from which follows non-S1 and S2) satisfy the moral demands at all better than A1 & A2 (from which S1 and S2 follows)? If suffering is in any case caused and (6) isn't realized, isn't it insignificant, what I do? This I counter: there is no "cluster-desire" "There must be non-S1 & non-S2 ... non-Sn", but only a number of independent (actual and potential) non-prevailing desires of suffering. Some desires may be satisfied (rightly) while others are not (wrongly). We had better replace premiss (4) by another: there must be non-S1

& there must be non-S2 ... there must be non-Sn.

   The state of affairs is better in a situation, where (in whose immediate past?) there are less causes of a certain degree of suffering (or only causes of milder suffering) than in the alternative situation. A smaller amount of suffering-causing actions is part of a more just "entire package", that contains a smaller amount of suffering in the final situation.

   "Suffering-causing actions" don't always cause suffering, but statistically it is true: less suffering-causing actions, less suffering. So, if we compare large event-groups A and B, there is less suffering in the event-group, where there are less suffering-causes (actions or not). In the big whole a lesser suffering-amount is only realized as part of an "entire package", where there are less suffering-causes. So: if there must be as little suffering as possible, there must be an "entire package" containing as few suffering-causes as possible.

   In principle it is true: there must prevail an absolute absence of suffering. Only this is only-right. Only right is an "entire package", where the lifeless world and organisms together act in a way, that causes total absence of suffering. In principle, even elementary particles are obliged to strive for a full absence of suffering. However, as elementary particles are known to be indifferent to their obligations, even I abstain from directing moral demands at them. (Ethics is, finally, practical philosophy.)

   If I content myself with demanding or recommending only the attainable = only that, whose realization my moral recommendations even might further, I must formulate: there must be realized an "entire, temporally stretched package", that contains a combination of actions and inactions possible to agents susceptible to moral arguments, whose result contains the smallest amount of (intolerable) suffering attainable by their actions and inactions. (The smallest amount in the final situation of the event-series, since it is impossible to change the past with human powers, maybe even divine powers.)

   Let's now assume, that the smallest possible = smallest humanly attainable amount of suffering can only be realized by the smallest amount of suffering-causing actions. So, the smallest amount of suffering is always contained in an "entire package", an event-series, in the beginning of which there is the smallest humanly possible amount of suffering-causing actions. Ergo: if the most suffering-less possible alternative must be realized, then there must be realized some "entire package", which contains the minimum number of suffering-causing actions. (Does the negative claim also apply: if there shouldn't be more suffering, then there shouldn't be an entire package, that contains more suffering-causing actions? Perhaps, but it was easier for me to show this by a positive formulation.)

   If refraining from causing suffering is not necessarily the best means to minimize suffering, it is insignificant whether (1) we avert suffering by refrainings or actions (2) we concentrate on preventing or diminishing suffering. Again: humankind must perform actions and abstainings, whose results contain the smallest possible amount of (intolerable) suffering. Or - since no one can control the actions of all humankind (the pragmatical viewpoint again) - every individual must perform such actions (also cooperation- and law-initiatives), with which she can (with some probability) realize the largest amount of suffering-preventing or -diminishing.

   In any case, the negative duties are not obviously weightier than the positive ones. An action, which induces suffering, may be justified, if we can by its aid prevent/satisfy a (more intense) ending-desire or more intense suffering - or a more compelling positive desire - and not increase the amount of future dissatisfaction. The "increasing danger" is present, e.g., in our using other people as suffering-combatting means against their desires. This can be expected to weaken the trust between individuals, and what kind of consequences does this have for individuals' willingness to cooperation? (Whatever the consequences, everyone is obliged to refrain from autocratic suffering-inducing, if only thanks to the principle of the suffering-minimum. If I cause someone to suffer, the thus caused suffering-ending desire obliges me to help her also, so it is possible that I could cause a better entire state of affairs by refraining from her torturing and concentrated on helping others.)

   The existence of positive duties, that I touched on, seems like a tricky question, if we proceed from traditional duty-views. Are we obliged to reduce suffering? The most part of the suffering in the world would exist even without me - surely I am not responsible for suffering, that I haven't caused? Surely it isn't my fault, that the world exists?

   In my view, even here we have to look for the answer in facts, existing desires. One could defend the existence of positive duties, in addition to the just said, like this.

   Every sufferer wants unconditionally, that her suffering end by any means possible, by the actions of whoever. (It is possible, that the sufferer wouldn't accept all means, e.g. such, that would harm her children. In making moral decisions, however, the exceptions are relatively insignificant - there remains a broad spectrum of actions, whose performing the sufferer may be said to unconditionally want and which her children also tolerate.) It is experienced necessary - the necessity exists - that someone/something help the sufferer.

   But do cognitively simple animals have desires for help? Do they have an idea of help or "whatever-ness", of "whichever" means? Maybe we'd better stick to the containing-necessity argument. That is: any time that someone/something suffers, there is the ending-of-suffering desire, the ending-necessity. The suffering must end, and its ending can only be realized by an "entire temporally extended package", that contains suffering-ending actions of moral agents. In other words: every moral agent must diminish suffering in the world as much as she can. (I find the strictness of this proposition frightening, so you may act wisely by being sceptical towards my following attempts to moderate it.)

   On the other hand: avoiding one's own suffering is equally important as avoiding that of others. (Every "self" experiences the ending and not-starting of her suffering as important as everyone "else".) My own suffering is also the only suffering, that I perceive directly - its existence is for me a more certain fact than the suffering of other humans and animals, that (whose facades?) I see.

   Even if we consider the existence and suffering of other minds facts: it is commonly known, that excessive exertions can lead to painful exhaustion, deterioration of cognitive capacities and illnesses. To which extent do we have to protect existing resources - capacities and abilities of body and mind - in losing which we lose (some of) our ability to reduce and prevent suffering, even our ability to look after ourselves? Maybe I should formulate more leniently: from everyone according to her capacity?

   And what is my particular duty? It is surely useful to consider, in which areas one's particular talents, skills, knowledge and (for maintaining energy) interest objects would bring about the largest amount of good. It is also useful to increase one's skills and knowledge. And speaking of knowledge: since every subject knows best, when she suffers, she herself can most speedily intervene with her causes of suffering. I dare to recommend to everyone working for (also) one's own happiness and advancing in this. The fact, that everyone is the most competent guard of her own happiness, can be considered to lead to moderate egoism. (On the other hand, if we acknowledge the significance of factual privilegedness - and deny solipsism - we must also conclude, that everyone has a particularly weighty duty to help those, whom she alone (in addition to the sufferer) knows to suffer.) From moderate egoism may be inferred the desirability of an upbringing, which helps the child (or adult) to develop as an independent problem-solver.

   -I notice myself to support aims that are popular even without me in the modern (western) world, at least on the level of editorials. Is this worrying considering my independence of thinking? Actually I do unconditionally support only these claims: 1. we can be held to be obliged to avoid causing suffering 2. we can be held obliged to diminish suffering. To what extent, is uncertain. In any case, I dare to recommend at least small attempts at reducing the bad and undesired 3. in making moral decisions, it may be useful to also remember the question of preserving capacities and the privileged position of the sufferer as knower of her suffering (its existence, existence time and ending-means). And the somewhat less privileged position of everyone concerning the suffering in her immediate environment.

   I ask you to notice, that moral facts - existing desires - reveal directly only the absolute values and absolute non-values, that must be pursued and avoided. Other grounds for moral decisions I have explored too little to be a competent practical ethicist. With other grounds I mean at least (1) what are the best means of attaining the broadest possible satisfaction (2) to which extent we should use satisfaction-increasing capacities now, to which extent preserve capacities for future use.

  

The ideal

So far I have mainly concentrated on negative norms and said: anything, of which it is experienced that it shouldn't be, shouldn't be. Similarly we can say: everything, of which it is experienced that it must be, must be (all mental images, of which it is experienced, that they must be realized, must be realized). The satisfaction of towards-directed desires is (often) equally experienced as necessary - factually necessary - as that of suffering-ending desires. If we acknowledge avoiding-desires as moral facts (obligating shalling-not-be:s), consistency requires, that we also acknowledge attaining-desires as such (obligating shalling-be:s). I for my part can't find any counterargument for this. In addition, since the non-satisfaction of positive desires regularly leads to suffering and its ending-desire, the question "should morals be based also on positive desires" is finally only an academic question (with all due respect to academies).

   A perfect world, where everything would be only right, would lack everything, that any subject livelily experiences as shalling-not-be (intolerable). In a perfect world, all desires would be satisfied immediately (and life would still be interesting and challenging. Or rather brainless euphoria?). In our world, this is obviously hard to attain. What should we then do in situations, where it is impossible to satisfy every subject's positive and negative desires? Which are the desires (or desirers?), whose satisfaction should be prioritized?

   I postpone my answer a little, because I suspect, that all readers do not even accept my model for a perfect world. In a perfect world - there are no intolerability-experiences and all positive desires are satisfied without delay? As far as I understand, ethicists rely commonly on the rule: a moral system, that differs from the moral intuitions of the majority of people, should be doubted if not rejected. It is admittedly hard to find a person, whose moral sense would advise to obey all avoiding-desires and positive desires - or a moral system, that would do so. In its spirit my principle does, however, accord with the golden rule: treat others the way you would want yourself to be treated. The aim to end all intolerability-experiences and satisfy all desires is also an aim, which an impartially empathetic creature would pursue - a creature, that wouldn't judge from without: that is a superficial/immature/sick/selfish desire; you can manage just fine without that).

   The unfamiliarity of my principle is an unavoidable result thereof, that the rule "satisfy all desires" is in practice impossible to implement, if you aren't an omnipotent god (who is able to place each subject in its closed virtual world). One could assume, that when moral systems have been created, the creators have striven for practicability, possibility to live by. A moral system is practicable only if it raises some desires or aims - or desirers or aimers - above others in importance (and this is just what I aim to do, too).

   I suspect, that one important reason for our spontaneous reactions against my principle is the strictness towards ourselves, that we have learned when internalizing some of the moral systems of our world of limited resources. Maybe also the pride in our willpower, that we feel when abstaining from "sins". "With satisfying every desire we create a society of good-for-nothings raised in cotton wool!"

   -When saying, that the satisfaction of all desires is important, I also mean future desires. If moral subject S wants to eat food known as illness-inducing, we must decide, if this desire is more important than S:s probable future desire to get well.

   On the other hand: how fatal is the incompatibility (or frictioned compatibility) with the moral intuitions of the majority? The moral intuition of the majority is used as a moral touchstone only in lack of a better one - since there "is not" any impartial knowledge of right and wrong. The knowledge of avoiding- and attaining-desires is this sought-for impartial knowledge. Avoiding- and attaining-desires are shalling-not-be:s andd shalling-be:s, that exist admittedly by all. I suggest, that we dismiss opinion-democracy and replace it by a democracy of desires.

The prioritization of desires

Satisfying all desires is, as admitted, only an unattainable ideal. How should we act in a real-life situation, where the realization of a state of affairs is both required and wrong? I already offered a tentative answer: we must avoid that, which is most wrong. Now I motivate this a little.

   So far I have said: what is experienced important, is factually important. Consistently with this, we may continue: what is experienced most important, is factually most important. If there are several degrees of should-not-be experiences of situation-experiences (which most would probably find obvious), the most unconditionally shalling-not-be are those situation-experiences, which are connected to the most unconditional should-not-be experiences, the most compelling avoiding-desires. (Connected to these situation-experiences there is the most unconditional necessity of the situation ending - these situations are factually most necessary to end.) Reversely: most important is the satisfaction of those positive desires, whose satisfaction is experienced as most unconditionally important - the most compellling and persistent desires. My experience tells me, that the non-satisfaction of these also causes the most intense suffering (the most unconditional avoiding-desire).

   These premisses make it clear: if a situation is both right = acceptable but no required, the injustice (wrongness) is weightier. A positive avoiding-desire is weightier than an experience of allowedness-to-be, of tolerating - in other words: lack of avoiding-desire. A both wrong and allowable (to different subjects) situation must be treated as a wrong one. Only a positive towards-desire can compete with an avoiding-desire.

   Let's proceed to a more difficult question: judging the intensity of desires. On what grounds can a moral agent consider one desire more intense than another (if the desires are not her own)? For starters I discuss, which avoiding-desires are more intense than others.

   So far I have mainly spoken of intolerability-experiences and ending-desires connected to suffering. I admit, that there are other lively ending- and not-starting desires as well. There are (2) losses of an unconditionally-wanted thing (a loved one, one's moving ability, the respect of society), that lead to exclamations: this must not happen (and regularly also lead to sufffering). There is (3) compassionate "co-suffering", the intolerability of seeing another human or animal sufffer. There are (4) experiences of the ugliness or grotesqueness of landscapes, persons, actions and speech, that "deprive them of their right to exist" (as the ugliness-experiencing person may jocularly formulate). There are (even stronger than these?) feelings of disgust towards e.g. touching dirt or insects. There are (6) disagreeable, but not painful sensations - bad smells and tastes, irritating noises. There are (7) fears of suffering or other intolerable things (also death) being realized in the future - and (8) fears of their (assumed) causes (loss of job - loss of income - loss of tolerable life). There are (9) decisions to perform actions, that lead to the desirer's experience: "this must not happen", when the action is impossible to perform. (10) The internalizing of a moral rule is, similarly, a decision to not accept a certain situation or action (or to demand that it exist) - and may lead to a kind of should-not-be experience - often (11) anger. Supporting a moral rule is - I admit - often connected to (12) distaste towards an "injustice" and desire that it end. (If the kind of projectivism above presented is, at least sometimes, the right account for the genesis of moral experiences, the distaste may even be the source of moral experiences.)

   At first I ask, if I could simplify my task: are some classes of the intolerable overlapping.

   My personal experience is, that bad smells and tastes are painful to experience - in extreme cases extremely painful, in mild cases insignificant to moral discussions. Therefore I place them in the class of suffering. (Yes: in my intensity-judgments I rely mainly on introspection. This is only an opening to a discussion - others may come and investigate the matter with a more scientific approach. For all I know, they may have done so already.) Touching something disgusting (imagined or realized touching), for its part, raises fear.

   As an emotion, the fear towards causes of something intolerable doesn't in my opinion differ from fear towards the intolerable. I place different fears in the same class. Similarly: the distaste towards a moral injustice (if it isn't co-suffering) doesn't differ, as an emotion, from other ugliness-experiences - if not by being weaker than they.

   As far as I can see, co-suffering may be erased from the list, if only because the situation that causes it is intolerable in itself, thanks to the original suffering of the "original sufferer" (if there is indeed original suffering, i.e. the co-sufferer isn't wrong in her belief).

   After these simplifications (I don't even try to remove all overlappings), the list of intolerables looks like this:

   1. suffering

   2. losses of wanted

   3. ugliness

   4. the feared future/present intolerables or their causes (in connection with activated fear, in situations where the feared seems to approach or is present)

   5. decision-contrary, non-accepted neglecting of actions or moral injustices (also the non-realization of required things)

   6. causes of anger.

I admit: also losses, ugliness-experiences and fears are often painful. However, I place them in other classes than pains, because (according to my personal experiences) they are not necessarily painful (even though they are non-desired). Even the most painful loss, that of something unconditionally wanted, contains pauses in the suffering - and the suffering is not as painful as pain-sensations or anxiety can be.

   Which of these are experienced as the hardest to endure? I would say: I have the most unconditional should-not-be experience, when I am experiencing intense suffering. Only then do I feel: this MUST end (only this experience requires use of capitals). It's easy for me to forget this when not suffering, but every intolerable pain or painful experience reminds me of what is really important. I believe, that internalizing this is a necessary condition for consistently moral acting.)

   Factually most important would then be to avoid causing, prevent, diminish and alleviate intolerable suffering.

   At first glance this seems obvious, but is it an intellectually honest claim? Even when I see intolerable ugliness I may feel (even if it is only "detestable" and doesn't make me actually suffer), that it must vanish. Could we say: in the former case my suffering is intolerable, in the latter the ugliness, but the degree of intolerability is the same? (Formerly I considered the answer: in the former case my experience is intolerable, in the latter an external object. But even the ugly object, that I see, is my experience.) Well - I leave the question to be considered.

   I think we can safely claim: a subject's own extreme suffering is the kind of experience, that the subject cannot easily demolish by directing her attention elsewhere (if it isn't obviously caused by a certain object of attention, from which it is easy to detach one's attention) like when seeing something ugly or (even) experiencing a difficult loss. Common sense says: when the subject can easily end her intolerability-experience, external help is less important. So, I propose: in situations, where we cannot obey the "action injunctions" of everybody's intolerability-experiences, we must prioritize those intolerability-experiences, that their subjects experience as the hardest to ignore. The practical conclusion stands: most important is the avoiding of intolerable suffering.

   I do not claim that it is easy to turn one's attention away from losses, either (towards the remaining goods), but I find that this is due more to lack of desire than lack of capability. Also: even losses are connected to suffering as well as a situation-intolerability-experience, but (as stated) at least in my case this has been milder than the suffering connected to pain-sensations or anxiety caused by unconscious reasons. It would be preferable, that difficult losses could be avoided, but I don't grant them a priority-position among things to be avoided. Even seeing ugliness may cause intense suffering, but this suffering is easily avoided by re-directing one's attention.

   I claim: easiest to ignore are things contrary to one's decisions, including things judged as immoral. It  takes an effort to attach to a decision - letting loose of it takes none. Also: seeing ugliness is terrible, losses are terrible, but seeing something judged as wrong is a weak experience, unless it is strengthened by another intolerability, like co-suffering or an intense ugliness-experience. Therefore I claim: morally condemned situations are not to be included in the list of "factual injustices".

   In extreme cases, the feared intolerable is experienced as absolutely necessary to avoid. If I want to be consistent, I cannot deny the moral necessity to end the threats of the feared, or fears - regardless, whether the fear is painful.

   Is fear as difficult to ignore as suffering-avoiding desires? The threat of something feared is also typically hard to ignore - often morally unwise as well, since the feared is experienced as intolerable at the latest when realized. Maybe we should judge threats of the feared according to the intolerability-degree of the realized feared - give up treating them as an independent injustice-category?

   This might be motivated, if there were no irrational fears. By these I mean fears, whose object is intolerable for the subject in no other way than its feared-ness. For me the fear of the dark has been like this: after letting go of the thought "I must away from here, immediately" and replaced it with the thought "I am here, fully" I noticed, that there was nothing unpleasant in being in the dark. A more universal case of something feared, that is not painful when realized, is death.

   So, I think that threats of the feared should be preserved as their own injustice-category. Does their injustice-degree differ from the injustice-degree of suffering? My personal experience says, that conquering fears is easier than the experiencing of pain-sensations as painless (even the latter is possible, but requires notably more expertise). So, I grant suffering a higher injustice-degree than fears. (Personally at least I have felt, that even the most intense fear isn't actual suffering. At most, an unremitting attempt to flee leads to painful exhaustion.)

   We have yet to discuss the category of anger-reasons. Anger is typically directed at persons, not situations - often persons, who have done something morally condemned by the anger-subject. When getting angry at someone for moral reasons I feel, that a) the existence of the perpetrator is intolerable b) the perpetrator's lack of remorse and neglect of rectifying the action's consequences, when possible for the perpetrator, is intolerable.

   If no one or nothing experiences the existence, remorselessness etc. of the perpetrator intolerable independently of her moral judgment, I am wrong in my judgment of the injustice of these. Most right would be, that I would become aware of the groundlessness of my judgment and calm down. (Factually most right? Who experiences so? I claim this, because the ending of every should-not-be experience rectifies some injustice - and because noticing an error is an easy way to end a should-not-be experience.)

   Still: as long as my anger - a lively should-not-be experience - exists, it must be considered a constituent of injustice. (Yes: even the injustice of the existence of the perpetrator. I remind you, that situatiuons can be simultaneously wrong and required.) So, what is the intensity-degree of anger-reasons as injustices?

   According to my experience, my anger is always a consequence of my thinking: that should not be. So, injustice-judgments are apt to arouse anger. Surely there are other anger-reasons as well: if I experience myself to be judged without grounds, I get angry, because I expect others to perceive me the way I am. After all, my strengths are visible to everyone! After all, we live in a shared world! (I feel, that others should see things as they are. Yet I wouldn't call this a moral

judgment, but a lively "should-not-be"-experience.

   My anger is caused by the thought: "that should not be", and by my holding on to the thought. I "cannot" let go of the thought of the situation's prohibition (by me) and let the situation prevail - even as a starting-point, that I could try to rectify. My point is: as soon as I fully admit to myself, that the bad situation prevails - when I stop struggling against it in my mind - my anger ends. Looking the fact in the eye demolishes the anger. (This also applies to anger caused by general irritability. But how can I venture to claim, that anger is always caused in this way? Simplifying a little: that only a persistent holding on to a thought can engender pressure, that sometimes erupts as violence, seems to me intuitively as obvious, as it is logically obvious, that all single men are unmarried. Those, who think this a groundless claim, I counter: logical apparency is in the end as ungrounded as intuitive apparency.)

   Anger is easy to control with a decision to acknowledge a fact as a fact - according to my experience notably easier than to control physical suffering, loss anxiety or fears. Therefore I give it a low injustice-degree. Yet, since even anger control requires a little expertise, it should be harder to ignore than ugliness-experiences or (non-anger inducing) things contrary to decisions.

   I must admit: for a person, who isn't familiar with anger management techniques, conquering anger is just as unattainable a goal as pain-management by mental methods. In spite of this, the low injustice-degree of anger-reasons may be grounded: as an intense feeling, anger only lasts a little while at a time. Nature rectifies rapidly the injustice of anger-reasons, if anger alone constitutes the injustice of these.

   My tentative order of injustices, from the most to the least to-be-avoided, is then:

   1. suffering-reasons or suffering

   2. threat of feared or fear (also objects of disgust or disgust)

   3. loss of unconditionally-wanted or non-acceptance of loss

   4. anger-reasons or anger

   5. ugly objects (or sounds) or ugliness-experience

   6. decision-contrary (also moral-contrary) situations or decisions (morals?).

Most uncertain I am of the order of  2. and 3.

   What about the intensities of positive (towards-directed) desires? Many a materially privileged person would surely be ready to say, that sexual desire is the most intense. I suspect, though: after having starved (of food) most people would even be tempted to eat dirt or other normally unappetizing objects. The intensity of bodily desires (I don't say "needs" * (note in end of this chapter)) seems to correlate strongly with the duration of their non-satisfaction.

   In any case, fact remains: sexual desire is (for many, often) compelling - even at its start. So, the desirers (factually) have to get an opportunity of satisfying it. This also applies to young people (even children), the aged, the disabled and different kinds of institution interns - and to desires during work- or school-hours.

   Sexual discrimination of minorities is (I believe) growingly condemned also in Finland - though many a parent seems to have a forceful opinion of an age limit, under which a child "cannot" compellingly want sex. The sexual rights of animals I haven't even noticed being discussed. Do we really believe, that animals don't experience compelling desire or suffer from sexual abstinence? Often a family has only one pet, whose sexual advances towards its owners are coldly rejected (!). (I won't even start to discuss the sexual rights of production animals.) So, if a dog wants to relieve its sexual pressures against the leg of its owner, should it be allowed to do so? Fact-morals says: yes, if there are no weighty reasons to the contrary. The mild

embarrassment of the owner is a light-weight counterargument to the imperative of animal lust. When ethics and etiquette conflict with each other, etiquette must give in! (This raises the question of the justification of rapes. For my part I venture to generalize, that masturbation is sufficient to relieve all the possible desire, whose intensity exceeds the intensity of the rape victim's desire to get rid of her suffering. After all, most right is a situation, where both the sexual desire and the suffering-avoiding desires of both parties are satisfied or not-even-started.)

   I think we can claim reasonably safely, that desires caused by bodily sensations, including desire of (non-sexual) touch, are harder to ignore than e.g. the desire to possess (non-sexually) a beautiful object. It is harder to turn away one's attention from one's bodily sensations than from outer-world objects. Therefore I place bodily desires (so-called needs, that also maintain good health - resources of producing good) before the latter (so-called whims). I do the same with the desire of action and desire of company, for humans and many other species. (The desire to rest I don't classify as a positive desire, but as a desire to avoid suffering, painful struggling when tired.) Otherwise I don't have much to say about positive (towards-directed) desires. Others may investigate the matter more thoroughly. Maslow's hierarchy of needs, for example, answers a question similar to mine: which desires become ignored thanks to other, more powerful desires. It's difficult to get closer to a quantification of desires.

   In sum: of all injustices most wrong is a suffering, which isn't in an apparent way caused by an object of attention (like an ugly object) that is easy to ignore (placed outside the sufferer's body), and the non-satisfaction of the most compelling (bodily?) desires. So, most weightily required is demolition or prevention of such positive and negative desires.

   Suffering is painful and its ending increases pleasure; the non-satisfaction of compelling desires is painful and their satisfaction increases pleasure. Therefore: hedonistic utilitarians are right! (Well, at least roughly.) Most right is a situation, that contains least suffering and most pleasure. Aesthetic moral systems (like the one of Nietzsche) are wrong: no one experiences the valiance of life or human as more important (or as less ignorably important) than the ending of her own intolerable suffering. Liberalist ethics are wrong when permitting individuals to fight with each other or otherwise induce pain in one another. When experiencing pain, everyone feels, that it "shouldn't be". Only future pain can be ignored.

   In hedonist-utilitarian terms: increasing a pleasure less than perfect is always morally required. Every subject, whose pleasure isn't absolute, wants a more full pleasure. I venture to claim so, because I find: a less-than-perfect pleasure is mingled with pain - and every sufferer wants to get rid of her suffering. So, the desire to increase one's pleasure and the desire to get rid of one's (intense) suffering can both be classified as suffering-avoiding desires. The avoiding-desire of intense suffering is, one could assume, more unconditional than the avoiding-desire of mild suffering. Therefore: demolishing intense suffering is more unconditionally important than perfecting pleasure (in situations, where we must choose). In a utilitarian calculus we must give more weight to the demolishing and preventing intense suffering (i.e., I support negative utilitarianism, insofar as we only consider desires concerning pleasure and suffering).

   If intense suffering and imperfect pleasure are seen as points in the same (suffering-)continuum, it gets impossible to think of doing good as a zero sum game (where the result is a neutral zero, if a value of +5 somewhere is added to the value of -5 elsewhere). Nothing can reduce the injustice of intense suffering.

   I also claim: the ending of intense suffering for one subject is more important than the ending of milder suffering for many. Let's imagine a starting point situation, where the suffering value for one subject is 8 (intense suffering), and that of five others is 2 (uncomfortableness) each - and two different development models: a) the suffering value of all five "2-sufferers" is turned to zero (unmarred happiness) and the experience of the "8-sufferer" is let to stand b) the suffering value of the "8-sufferer" is lowered to 6 and the "2-sufferers' " experiences are let to stand. In the development a) the injustice of the whole is not diminished from the starting point. It is still wrong with the weight of an eight: there is an injustice of eight. In situation b) there is no injustice greater than that of six, so it is less wrong.

   We mustn't add the suffering values of different subjects together and see, how many extreme should-not-be experiences they form - after all, mild sufferings do not factually form extreme suffering (or mild pleasures extreme pleasure). The situation with the highest single suffering value is most wrong.

   So, is it right to lower one subject's suffering value from eight to seven by giving ten happy subjects a 7-value of suffering? I must answer: per se, yes. In practice this is not necessarily most right, since the suffering-reasons of the formerly happy might notably weaken their powers and ability to cultivate good in the future. (I am also afraid, that legalizing "sacrificing" people for others' sake would lead to general fear, lack of trust between people and fleeing from happiness-guards, maybe to alternative societies.)

   Estimating intensity of suffering is difficult, but if we want to act most right possible and if the injustice-degree of situations depends on the intensity of suffering, we cannot avoid making estimating-attempts. In moral decision-making we are forced to act based on uncertain knowledge (unlike in business, politics, agriculture and nursing?).

   Even in this country, a common but rarely discussed case of getting a small gain to many on the expense of a few is the noisy night delivery of mail. There are people who cannot, after being awakened by a delivery person's stamping in the staircase, go to sleep again before morning and get-up time. Even if these persons would only form one per mill of sleepers, this would make noisy night delivery a weighty injustice. For someone, who has slept many hours too little, her entire following day may be anguish - in practice all her life, since night delivery is continual.

* Speaking of "needs" seems to me to confuse the matter needlessly (no pun intended). In my view, when we say "she needs X" we often mean: "she must have X, so that she can have/preserve Y, that she is entitled to. (X can be, for example, the condition of health, survival or a tolerable life.) Desires and wishes are located simply in the mind of the desirer and wisher. Need, on the contrary, is something, whose "satisfying" the speaker considers morally required. Like I have said, requiredness cannot be motivated by a belief of requiredness without ending in infinite regress. -Sure, we talk about "needs" also in other meanings - we say: Vivian needs a key (in order to enter her apartment, which she aims to do - the "needed" is a means of gaining what the "needer" aims to gain - but these meanings are hardly relevant to moral discussions.

Order of desirers (sic)

Since the philosophical attitude says: let nothing be held certain without thinking, I must also discuss this: can subjects be put in importance order?

   The only unconditional moral norms, that follow from the aforesaid, are the avoiding of intolerable suffering and satisfying compelling desires. The satisfaction of compelling positive and negative desires is always unconditionally important (=experienced as unconditionally important), no matter, the desire of whom or what is in question. The compelling desires of all subjects - the ugly and the beautiful, the stupid and the intelligent, the soulless or the soulful, humans and animals - are unconditionally important to satisfy (or demolish). Also: avoiding the suffering of the dishonest is as important as that of the honest! Avoiding the suffering of adults is as important as that of children! Avoiding one's own suffering is as important as that of others.

   Even the worst torturer/criminal experiences the ending of her suffering as unconditionally important - there is its unconditional importance, its unconditional importance is a fact. By punishing criminals we aim, of course, (also) at preventing crimes, but the morally best alternative would be to prevent crimes without punishments. Such alternatives must be (and has been) investigated. I also think, that in order to prevent vengefulness, we should painstakingly emphasize the injustice of all suffering, when raising children.

   Similarly: an adult experiences her suffering as just as intolerable as a child her own = avoiding it is as important. Subjecting an adult to a suffering-inducing situation is more acceptable than that of a child only if the adult is capable of suffering less from the situation - on short or long term - than the child would suffer. Surely this is a more common state of affairs than its opposite. But we can also imagine a scenario, where an adult will be embittered (and forget morals?) for the rest of her life, if (for example) giving up a new life partner candidate, "the one", for the sake of her children. The weightiness of conflicting desires (I still don't say "needs"*) must be estimated individually in all different cases.

   I cannot refrain from warning of going to extremities in this direction, either - of over-emphasizing the "rights" of adults. Leaving small children in the care of others for the duration of their parents' (weekend-)vacation is, or can be, weightily wrong, perhaps most wrong, when the substitute carers are not continuously carers of the child (in an extended family or commune).

   I myself was left in the care of my grandmother for the weekend (really only the weekend? That's what my parents have said) when I was 2 - the only event of that time, that I can remember. As soon as my parents had left, I started to wait for them (whatever else I did) - perhaps partly therefore, that my mother had told me that they wouldn't be gone long. The vain waiting soon turned into anguish and my energy was consumed by imagining my parents coming back, so that all action became intolerably heavy for me. That is, I began to suffer from clinical depression (retrospective self-diagnosis). The experiences of day-care center children I can only make guesses at. A separation from one's nearest may be small potatoes for an adult, but for a (normal? exceptionally attached? one encouraged to wait?) child living hell. As a crumb of practical philosophy: if the parents want rest, maybe they could engage a babysitter and stay home?

   The alone-importance of satisfying compelling desires leads to the equality of subjects. Or does it? Even this inference would be possible: most unconditionally important is the satisfying of those subjects, whose positive desires and intolerability-experiences are the most intense. The passionate first!

   The conclusion is inevitable, if only a part of subjects are capable of extreme (e.g.) suffering experiences. This is hardly evolutionary-psychologically credible. For example, avoiding bodily mutilation is so important for the survival of the individual, that big differences between individuals in its intolerability-degree cannot be expected. And even if there would be great variations, in practice it is difficult to find out, whose intolerability-experiences are the most intense. Making assumptions in the matter is easy and dangerous. In her novel "Uncle Tom's Cabin" Harriet Beecher Stowe draws an uncomfortably familiar picture of a lady, who thinks: "The black (slaves) don't have the kind of family feelings that we do" and (consistently) interprets Mammy's, who has been separated from her children, joyless appearance as "sulking".

   Self admiration soon alone inclines many to believe, that all their experiences (or those of their tribe) are more intense than those of others. It is hardly wise to strengthen this inclination by moral systems, that emphasize differences in intensity of emotions/desires. And independently of this, epistemological difficulties make it best to avoid all probable intolerability-experiences of all subjects.

   The last said raises one more question. It is best to avoid the intolerability-experiences of all subjects (experiencers), the suffering of all sufferers. But who or which are sufferers? Animals cannot tell us about their possible sufferings verbally, often not unverbally either. Fish, reptiles or invertebrates cannot scream of pain and they have no muscles, that produce facial expressions. However assiduously we investigate, we cannot be sure of their ability to suffer. How do we know, that the behaviour patterns of animals, that in us are connected with pain (rubbing the damaged body part in crustaceans, the (ostensible?) attention's turning away from the outer world in fish, self dosage of analgesics in rats - cf. Braithwaite 2010) only occur in connection with experienced pain? All experience contents could logically also exist as non-experiential (and affect their "subjects' " behaviour?) as long as we cannot define the difference of "experience" and "non-experience" (phenomenon and non-phenomenon).

   We cannot be sure, but wouldn't it be terrible (factually terrible!) to cause suffering in a creature, that we have suspected of being able to suffer, because of lack of certainty? My common sense also says: the ability to experience pleasure, pain and desire is nature's incentive, that makes an organism pursue certain situations and avoid others. A moving organism, that wouldn't have pain sensations, would get mutilated frequently. If a "mechanical" stimulus-reaction chain would suffice to move animals, why do even humans have experiences? (Well - maybe suffering is needed to motivate the most intelligent animals to choose the best damage-avoiding strategy, and only in these animals motion requires decision? Or maybe it is needed, when the animal is affected by several, conflicting stimuli, so that the animal can make avoiding the biggest evil its priority? If this is the case, e.g. trouts and some crabs are obviously sensate (op. cit.).

   Epiphenomenalists don't believe in the ability of desires and moving-attempt(-experience)s to cause bodily movements, but think of them as evolutively meaningless by-products of certain brain events. To them I say: (1) pleasure and suffering, that are temporally connected to our

desires, are just the kind of experiences, that could make us perform pursuing- and avoiding-movements. If I experience something as terrible, I naturally want to avoid it. Isn't it quite a coincidence, that brain events leading to motions induce as their by-products just this kind of (=value-natured) experiences? (2) Even if desires, suffering etc. wouldn't have causal power, humans have them during certain brain processes - do we have any reason to suppose, that other animals haven't? (Of course, this is not conclusive proof.)

   I suggest the rule: if it seems to be directed by its perceptions, it might be able to desire and suffer. Of what, remains undecided. Clues to this can be had by observing, how the organism(-species) acts in its natural habitat, where it has more opportunity of choice than e.g. at a farm. But can we be certain, that production animals and pets want to live like their wild counterparts?

   Since Per Jensen's studies in the 1970's, research has suggested that domestic animals act very much like the wild variants do, if they have an opportunity to do so. (Jensen's domestic pigs poked about in the ground, formed social groups etc.) What is important to domestic animals, has also been investigated by giving them freedom of choice. Even that, how important the animals consider different things, can be investigated by observing, how much of an effort they are ready to make in order to get different privileges. We don't need to base our actions on guesses alone.

   When keeping pets and production animals, we should keep in mind at least these possible sources of suffering and unsatisfied desires: pain, noise, unsuitable temperature, unsuitable (for action or rest) lighting, bad smells, bad-tasting or unsuitable food; lack of nutrition, water, oxygen, rest (an undisturbed sleeping environment), of sex, touch or other company, of action or variation; loss of "spouse", "children", "parents" or familiar carer; restriction of moving. (I'm sure I forgot something essential - I'm sorry.) We act mostly-right only if we arrange for the animals an environment, that they would choose for themselves - according to best possible research - on every point of the checking-list. I claim so, if only because the satisfaction of animals' desires is equally important as that of humans (which is important!). The desires of animals are equally compelling - at least I haven't found any good reason to believe otherwise (cf. Vilkka 1996).

   Making animals' desire-satisfaction possible on all points may make the keeping of production unprofitable. If so, the moral inference is easy: we must give up keeping production animals. Which desires do we think are more easily ignored: the humans' desire to have meat, fish, eggs, milk or leather or the animals' pain-avoiding desire (castrations without anaesthesia) or sleep deprivation, the desire to run and leap, the desire to mate, the desire to touch another animal, the desire to keep one's offspring near, the desire to generally do something (other than peck or bite a companion)? The question may be falsely put: we don't know, that animals would even try to ignore their desires. If they don't try, they certainly don't succeed in doing so. All desires of animals are to their subjects impossible to ignore. If I want to be consequent, I can only make this conclusion: if animals don't try to ignore their desires, the satisfaction of animals' desires is more important than that of humans.

   The desires, that must be weighed against each other in the animal production question, are specifically the animals' desires to (in aristotelical terms) realize their species- or individual-essence and the humans' desire to eat good-tasting meat (or dress in good-looking and -feeling leather). A human doesn't need animal nutrition to stay healthy (Foer 2011), perhaps with some exceptions (the multi-allergic, persons whose organism doesn't produce certain fatty

acids).

   Animal production has also been defended by employment considerations, in which case we must compare the animals' desire to species-typical behaviour with the ex-farmers' need to get a new profession or (at worst) unemployment. In my view, even here there's no real competition.

   Even if we would arrange the animals' living circumstances in essential parts (according to best research essential) like the circumstances in nature, there would remain serious moral problems. First the problems in research: can a human with her sensation idiosyncrasies and other experiential idiosyncrasies even imagine all things, that are important to other species - ask the right questions? (Or, on the other hand: are the researchers inclined to excessive avoiding of anthropomorphism - e.g. to assume, that other animals don't suffer from an ugly environment?) Can we, in our choice-experiments, offer the animals sufficiently many alternatives to find the one that animals would choose - even many enough moving-space size alternatives? Do economical interests, or the researchers' ideas of what kind of improvements are feasible (without giving up animal production), control the research? Even at its best research only yields knowledge thereof, what the average members of a species want - what about exception individuals? And exception moods of average animals?

   Above I said, that everyone is the most alert guard of her own happiness. When restricting an animal's freedom to move we lessen its ability to guard its own happiness - satisfy its desires and escape from its sufferings, as soon as they surface. Restricting freedom increases the danger of unsatisfied desires. So, is it justified without weighty reasons (like circumstances, where the survival of humans depends on keeping animals)? Even classical utilitarianism considers as the right action the action, that guarantees the greatest amount of pleasure (or the best possible pleasure/suffering balance) among all subjects. A procedure, that specifically increases the danger of suffering (stronger suffering than meat-deprivation induces in humans) is hardly in accordance with this view of right acting either. Sure, even wild animals often suffer (from nutrition-deprivation, droughts etc.), but this doesn't disprove the argument. After all, we don't take production animals from nature and save them from even worse circumstances. By

breeding production animals we create new sufferers in addition to the animals, that suffer in nature. (Wouldn't the ethically sustainable inference rather be, that we must help wild animals?) It is hard to justify breeding animals in captivity, if we cannot show meat production etc. to be an alternative for something even worse.

   The breeding of animals is made even more problematic by the fact, that even the nowadays common level of happiness of animals depends on the carers. If a carer develops clinical depression and loses the energy to give her animals food and water, the animals can only suffer passively. This and similar dangers are always present in keeping animals, particularly so, when there is only one carer. Can we accept this, if the danger is realized in this country, say, at five farms a year? Or, rather: can the animals endure it? Can they endure the deliberate pain-inducing in slaughterhouses (where power, there misuse!) and the "unfortunate accidents" due to the "effectiveness" of the slaughter procedure? Above I ended up with the conclusion, that it is more important to avoid the extreme suffering of a few than the mild of many. It should be safe to continue: it is more important to avoid extreme suffering of a small number than to guarantee the culinary pleasures or keeping of profession for a large number.

   Someone may observe to me, that we can never remove all injustices from the world; we can legislate and try to enforce laws, but all crimes and accidents can never be prevented. This is true in itself, but in my view the keeping of production animals is connected to the possibility of exceptional suffering-inducing. Not many criminals deprive their victims of moving freedom for a long time so that the victim cannot provide herself with food and drink (at least not many outside prisons, in peacetime, in Finland). The easily-ignorable desire of a human to  have meat, cheese or ice cream doesn't justify (according to any kind of utilitarian calculus not restricted to humans) exposing animals to the danger of extreme suffering.

   -The last said raises the question: what is needed or necessary suffering-inducing or exposing to suffering? When we talk about "needed" or "necessary" suffering we proceed from the premiss, that the suffering-inducer pursues something, that is more important than avoiding the induced suffering - possibly, that it is more important to avoid the additional work or monetary expense, that would prevent the suffering (e.g., that fish "cannot" be killed individually on a trawler, but can be left to suffocate). Fact-morals says, though, that nothing is more important (less ignorably important) than avoiding suffering and satisfying compelling desires. So, justified would be the kind of use of animals, that satisfies compelling desire of food, sex etc. (beasts of burden, hunting dogs...?). And would fighting climate change justify replacing tractors and cars with real horsepowers? I believe, that many an ideal-utilitarian calculus would say Yes. Keeping horses in cramped single-stalls it surely doesn't justify. The animal must be able to move and socialize when the animal wants, not when it is convenient for the human.

Last words of defense

Above I have, I believe, consistently claimed, that phenomenal situations (situation-experiences, that contain desires), above all, are wrong or required - they, the consequences of actions, can make actions wrong or required. (Of course, a should-not-be experience or has-to-be experience can even be directed towards the action itself.)

   In everyday speech we call "wrong" or "required" above all actions - maybe only actions. H.A. Prichard (2010) thought, that in correct moral speech we never say "it should be so and so", but the expression is misuse of language. Here I disagree with Prichard.

   If we make clear to ourselves, what kind of properties we mean by "injustice" and "requiredness", we may well end up saying, that even situations (states of affairs) can have these properties. In my view, this is exactly the case: by "injustice" we mean truly-admitted-by-all existing shalling-not-be; an existing shalling-not-be (that we can observe) can only be a should-not-be experience or something caused by a should-not-be experience (prohibitions etc.): there are wrong states of affairs = the kind of existing-instances of (object-)experiences, that contain a should-not-be experience (painful experiences and other intolerability-experiences).

   A required state of affairs is the kind of existing-instance of (object-)experience, that contains a must-be(-and-strengthen)-experience - an object of positive (=towards-directed) desire. And a right = permissible state of affairs is the kind of existing-instance of an (object-)experience, that doesn't contain a should-not-be experience.

   Another point, where my language use differs from the usual, is that, that I don't call any situation only wrong, only right or only required. Isn't this, at least, misuse of language? Isn't it essential to our understanding of "required" or "wrong", that actions or situations are only required or wrong? I don't know - experiences of essentialness vary between individuals. But this kind of defense occurs to me: "requiredness" and "wrongness" is essentially shalling-be and shalling-not-be. If we can find in the world something (also-)shalling-not-be and (also-)shalling-not-be, we have found something required and something wrong. We have only been mistaken in our belief, that the required would be only-required and the wrong only-wrong.

   In any case, the "both-a-and-b-ness" doesn't make my moral system impracticable - we can decide, which situations and actions are most required and most wrong. Or am I entitled to speak of "required", "wrong" and "moral system"? I correct myself: my idea construction is practicable - it permits us to decide, which situations and actions are the most necessary admittedly-by-all and the most shalling-not-be admittedly by all. (Perhaps not a moral system, but better than nothing?)

   A more serious accusation of language misuse might be this: I demand the language user to call "shalling-not-be" a situation, that someone else experiences as shalling-not-be. (I have already discussed this, but I repeat it because of the importance of the matter.) In real life we never use language in this way. We only use the expression "should not be/prevail" on our own account - meaning "I want it to not be/prevail".

   I deny the latter claim. In the beginnning of the text I concluded, that in moral language use "wrong" refers specifically to a shalling-not-be independent of our desires - to an objective or universally-true shalling-not-be. In moral discussions we talk continually about a shalling-not-be that is independent of our own desires.

   "The shalling-not-be of X" we understand (I venture to generalize) to mean, that something screams for the ending of X - just like (or almost like) in connection with the avoiding-desire of X. Therefore we can plausibly call avoiding-desires "shalling-not-be:s". Or can we? Normally we don't acknowledge the desires of individuals as shalling-not-be:s. I believe, though, that the reason for this is only the fact, that we don't consider desires universal shalling-not-be:s (because "they cannot all be true at the same time"? because they are local?). I think that I have

shown above, that shalling-not-be:s etc. constituted by desires (claims of them) are universally true. The desires exist admittedly by almost everyone. We use language quite correctly when calling something experienced as shalling-not-be "shalling-not-be (and "morally wrong", insofar as the should-not-be experience is also motivated by badness - which I consider it always is).

   In moral thinking we always long for universally-true shalling-not-be - we just haven't noticed, that a should-not-be experience (of another subject or ourselves) is like this.

   In spite of this (once more): are the "shalling-not-be:s" that I have proposed (objects of desires) morally required? A negative answer can be motivated in at least two ways in addition to the already-mentioned.

   (1) We call (and are ready to call?) "moral norms" only demanderless demands and desirerless desire-like things (2) above I have accepted as a ground for moral injustice anything bad-for-someone/something, whose ending someone/something wants. But most would seem to think, that the desires of one individual (or whims of anyone) are not moral grounds. The name of "ground for moral injustice" is deserved only by something, that is more harmful than beneficial for the well-being of the entire society - or the highest preferences of the entire society. (I for my part assess first the (moral?) injustices, and only "afterwards" estimate the weightiness of injustices in the big whole.)

   It is hard to impugn these observations. Perhaps I don't, indeed, succeed in defending moral objectivism. But this doesn't make me seriously worried.

   I think I have shown, that the shalling-be and shalling-not-be of certain situations are universal facts. There is a shalling-end of certain situations - a compelling ending-desire - so everyone must admit, that these situations factually must end. And anyone must care for their ending, if her powers allow it. (Everything desired-to-end must end - in lack of better, the greatest possible part of it - and the ending of most possible desireds-to-end is only realized in an event series, in whose beginning moral agents strive for the ending of desireds-to-end.) I consider this - the requiredness admittedly-by-all - more important than the question, whether this is moral requiredness.

   Actually, something "universally-truly shalling-not-be" is in a stronger sense shalling-not-be than the "morally wrong", insofar as the latter only means something specified, like "harmful to general well-being". From the fact, that an action "harms general well-being", it only follows that we must refrain from the action if we pursue general well-being. Conditionally, not categorically.

   Everyone may not admit, that the word "should" has a referring meaning. Those who don't, I ask to think about the sentence: "my pain must end". Undeniably, the sentence is an expression of compelling ending-desire - the ending-desire almost forces the subject to cry it out. But it also has a cognitive content. The sentence is a cry, but not a meaningless cry. "Must" is the name of an experience content, a compelling desire. (I would also like to ask: if compelling desire isn't shalling-be, what is?)

   By "must" we mean the existence or presence of a compelling desire. (Not "the existence of my compelling desire", I claim) Or is the expressed or thought-about sentence an attempt to order the pain away? And only that? Do we not have any "must"-experiences? So, I claim: even in normal language use "must" sometimes refers to a desire. In this point I cannot be

accused (in a justified way!) of novel terminology. That we say "must" and "should" mostly in connection to our own desires (if we do), is perhaps caused by the fact, that the entire compellingness of a desire is revealed to us only if the desire is our own.

   Conceptual questions aside: the most surprising feature of my prescriptive ethics might be the fact, that it claims suffering-inducing to be more wrong than the killing (painlessly) of a human. Feared things are only on second place on my injustice-list. If a murder is committed secretly, for instance with a poison given to someone in the evening and killing her in her sleep, it might not even arouse fear in the victim. Do we have to conclude: this kind of killing is in no way wrong, if the victim has no close relatives or friends who would grieve for her and if she doesn't do significant work for the increasing of good in the world?

   I honestly think, that inducing suffering is in itself a greater injustice than killing - even when the victim knows and fears that she is dying. If a doctor saves her patient's life with a painful procedure, it is impossible for the patient to ignore her "this pain should not be"-experience (to not suffer from it). Of course, almost everyone considers the continuing of her life more important than relief of a momentary pain, but an intolerable pain is always harder to ignore than a mere thought, including the thought of one's own death (without which there is no fear of death).

   Still, I don't recommend killing people as a general practice. In my view, it is useful to keep it criminalized under normal circumstances (euthanasia is a question for itself). My educated guess is: if we had to be afraid of being legally killed, our trust towards each other would crumble. In lack of trust different social (sexual, cooperation-, business-)relations, that maintain satisfying life, would decrease. This reason does not, of course, show abortions, or even killing of newborns, wrong.

   Another serious problem, that may be seen in my "fact-morals", is, that it denies our obligations towards the unconscious (humans). The unconscious don't have desires, "factual shalling-be:s". This I counter: even fact-morals prohibits (for example) assaults or wallet-stealing of an unconscious person insofar as we can expect her to recover consciousness and suffer from the consequences of these actions. It doesn't prohibit combined robbery and killing of the unconscious, but legalizing this, too, would (I think) weaken the trust between people and hamper the functioning of society - at least the illl might think twice, before agreeing to subject themselves to surgery during anaesthesia. Beside this: even if I'd defend the right to kill the unconscious or the right to perform euthanasia on a person against her will (as a cure for occasional stomach-pains), I believe we could still sleep our nights in peace. A government, that prohibits painful cancer treatments and permits euthanasia against a person's will, is soon an ex-government. It should also be safe to say, more generally: when people have priorities, that conflict with their "hardest-to-ignore" desires, they will agree on rules, that respect these priorities, and encourage the recalcitrant "fact-moralist" to concentrate on her family and hobbies.