Almost all other texts in this blog are written in Finnish.
In this text I defend the position, that certain moral views (ie. certain beliefs in the wrongness, rightness ((acceptability)) or obligation of actions or states-of-affairs) are facts - provable, potentially admitted-by-everyone states of affairs. At least they are provable if we can trust beliefs, which we rely on in everyday life and based on which we make decisions (such as the sufferingness of other people and other animals).
Obligation and wrongness are also "true" in the meaning of "something existent" - existents (existing things) or relations between existents.
Above all, I hold, that moral states-of-affairs (wrongness and the like) can be inferred solely from facts - things admitted by everyone in everyday life - without reference to more general moral beliefs of any moral judge, or of wishes of the moral judge.
I hold, that is, that moral views can be motivated (also) by facts about states-of-affairs outside the mind of the moral judge.
I claim, that moral opinions can be motivated thereby, that there is mustn't-be-ness, or wrongness, and must-be-ness, or moral obligation. Something exists, that can be called mustn't-be-ness - eg. desires of sufferers for their suffering to end. (Later on, I motivate this and talk about how the moral weight of different desires should be determined.)
There is mustn't-be-ness, ie. mustn't-be-ness is an unquestionable fact. In this sense, Hume's guillotine in its general sense is disprovable. I mean the position: "What ought to be, cannot be deduced by anything that is". I hold, that what should be or shouldn't be, can be inferred from something that is.
Later on, I also defend the stance, that it is more important to avoid the most intense sufferings (even of a small number of subjects) than to intensify the pleasures (or diminish the moderate sufferings) of a large number of subjects.
I must begin by pondering, what is meant by moral "wrongness", "rightness" or "obligation".
Are moral sentences expressions of feelings?
Alfred Ayer proposed, that moral sentences of the type "stealing is wrong" are merely expressions of feelings, like "Ouch!" is an expression of pain. According to him, moral sentences do not claim anything, ie. they are neither true nor false - in other words, they have no truth-value, (A true sentence has a positive truth-value and a false one a negative truth-value, but according to Ayer, moral sentences have neither.)
The Ayerish position, according to which moral sentences are feeling-expressions without truth-value, is called "emotivism".
Expressions of feelings must be distinguished from claims about feelings. For instance, the sentence "I'm in pain" is a claim about the feelings of the speaker, that is true or false (in this case, mendacious); the expression "Ouch!" has no truth-value.
The position, according to which moral sentences are claims about the speaker's feelings, is known as "subjectivism". According to subjectivism, the sentence "theft is wrong" would mean something like "I hate stealing". For myself, I consider subjectivism a false stance - by "moral wrongness" we seem to mean something more generally wrong than something we feel to be bad ie. unpleasant, or more generally wrong than something (some action) that we wish not to be performed. (I motivate this in more detail in my older blog text "Facts of right and wrong II", august ((elo)) 2016.)
As mentioned, Ayer held that the sentence "Stealing is wrong" is an expression of feeling, or it expresses something like "Stealing fye!".
I consider this interpretation poossible only if we don't pay enough attention to our uses of the word "wrong". The term "expression of feeling" should also be taken under scrutiny.
To begin with: As far as I can see, "expression of feeling" means something - a word, a sound, a gesture - that is almost forced out of the subject ("feeler"). According to this definition, the sentence "That painting is horrible!" is an expression of feeling. But it seems, that it is something else as well.
The sentence doesn't go: "How horrible!", but: "The painting is horrible/horribly ugly!". The sentence seems like a statement about ugliness in the external world - not just an ugliness-experience - and does it only seem so?
When I see an ugly painting, I feel, that the ugliness is located in the painting. I don't experience the painting to be "out there" and the ugliness "in here", in my mind. They are both "out there" (non-me) and inseparable from each other.
In our childhood we learn, that beauty "actually" exists in the beholder's eye, but I claim, that our language reflects our original experience. It seems plausible to think, that originally, we have used this kind of sentences in order to express naïvely realistic beliefs of ugliness inherent in external objects. If you like: beliefs, that are originated by the projection of our feelings on the external world.
My point is: even sentences that express "projection beliefs", are expressions of beliefs. They have a cognitive content, such as "The object X has the experiencer-independent property 'ugliness'/'badness´", ie. they are not just "blurtings-out" of feelings. Therefore: if we use moral sentences to express naïvely realistic "projection beliefs" (which is at least possible), moral sentences must be considered genuine expressions of beliefs.
As a logical empiricist, Ayer could not admit sentences expressing "projection beliefs" to be meaningful claims - they are improvable, metaphysical sentences. But this doesn't justify the inference, that feeling-expression is their function or their only function.
Everyone can freely deliberate, whether she herself expresses (only) a feeling by talking about "wrongness" - whether the word is an outburst of loathing or the like - or if the word has meanings, ideas evoked by them.
But now I proceed to the main point in my discussion of emotivism.
If I ask myself: "Would it be wrong of me to participate in a study concerning bacteriological weapons?", the word "wrong" cannot be a feeling-expression. If I ask, whether something is wrong, I don't call it wrong - I don't express a feeling. (I assume, that the word "wrong" has the same meaning in questions as in statements.) Therefore it would seem, that "wrongness claims" are not (at least merely) feeling-expressions, but some kind of genuine claims.
If we assume, that the meaning of the word "wrong" is in a broad sense "emotive", pertaining to emotions, my question could be given the meaning: Would a study of weapons have consequences, that I would think eg. horrible. Given this, "wrong" would mean "held horrible by me". And this wouldn't be an emotivist, but a subjectivist interpretation. As I mentioned earlier, I hold this position false, too.
Prescriptivism - the view "moral claims and terms are recommendations meant to be universally followed" - presents the similar problem. My "claim" of the rightness of an action might be just a universal recommendation by me. But what would we mean by the often-asked question of whether something is right? Would we perhaps mean, whether the action is worth recommending? But if we do, the word "right" refers to something worth recommending - we don't only use it for recommending.
Emotivism and prescriptivism are both non-cognitivist stances - they claim, that moral sentences are not real claims, ie. they don't express beliefs, but something else. All non-cognitivist views present the same difficulty, when applied to questions.
All in all, I hold: when speaking of moral wrongness etc., we mean something (some state of affairs) - and not just something about our own feelings or desires.
Now I proceed to deliberate, what we mean by "wrong", "right" and "obligatory".
The naïve notion of wrong
What does it finally mean, that some action or state-of-affairs is "wrong" or "right" - maybe "obligatory", such as the fulfilment of a responsibility? As far as I can see, that the action in question mustn't be (ought not to be) or can be allowed to be - or must be (ought to be). And what does it mean, that something "mustn't" or "must" be?
My own idea of an action that "mustn't" take place, is - or was in my childhood and youth, before I was acquainted with the meaning-analyses of philosophers* -a picture, where the entire universe strives for the non-prevalence of the action - or desires, that the action not take place.
I believe, that my idea was created like this: as a child, when I committed myself to avoiding some "naughty" action (following my parents' influence), I had to create a picture in my mind to remember what to avoid - I created a picture of avoiding the action without imagining myself as the avoider. Images were created in my mind, where the "wrong" actions were avoided without an "avoider" - or obligatory actions aimed at without an "aimer-at".
The image of a subjectless or ubiquitous avoiding may have gained strength from my impression, that 1) the avoidance of any action wasn't only my parents' wish - and my parents avoided them even if they didn't want to 2) the avoidance of "wrong" or "naughty" actions was expected from everyone in my environment.
Given that "wrong" means - to all/most others as well as me - something that is avoided without an avoider, it seems apparent, that there is no "wrongness". And given, that "wrong" means - to all/most others as well as me - something that the entire universe avoids: if the universe as a whole isn't a conscious, desiring and striving being, there is no wrongness.
Even if the universe is a conscious being, we cannot observe, what it tries to avoid - we cannot base our morals on what it tries to avoid or attain.
* Actually I think, that the accurate notions of "wrong" and "right" are precisely those of the persons not acquainted with moral philosophy. A word or a sentence means, what most of its users hold it to mean.
Meanings of "mustn't"
Could it be true in some other sense of "mustn't be", that some actions or states-of-affairs mustn't be?
I ask: in which meanings do we use the expression "mustn't be"? In which non-moral contexts do we use the expression? (The meanings in moral contexts I already discussed.)
My answer is: We say that something "mustn't be", among other things, when we unconditionally want something not to be - when we find something intolerable - such as the loss of our spouse or of our ability to move, or our own intense pain.
Another context, where we use the expression "mustn't", is when we say eg. to a child: "You mustn't do that", ie. meaning "Don't do that". The sentence is only an attempt to influence the child's behaviour, a part of a language game - it doesn't refer to the way things are.
Because this "mustn't" doesn't refer to facts, it obviously cannot be true, that something is wrong in its sense.
A third context, where we say "mustn't", is when we mean, that someone or something - the law, the legislation, the rules of a game - has prohibited the action - and perhaps imposed a punishment for performing it. Even this meaning wouldn't exist without the once-existed aim or desire of someone to avoid the action or its consequences.
I claim: All meanings of "mustn't" are ultimately based on the desire, that something not be or not be done. Therefore it can be claimed, that something is wrong - mustn't prevail - on the condition, that someone or something wants it not to prevail. The desire of non-prevalence may be called having-not-to-prevail ("musting-not-prevail"?).
Objectively or universally true?
Someone will certainly point out: But don't we, by a moral "must not be", mean some kind of objective - experiencer-independent, non-experiential - having-not-to-be?
Well - for my part, I would be willing to admit something a moral "wrongness" given, that it is universally truly having-not-to-be.
The desire, that some action or state-of-affairs not prevail, may be called an existing - admitted existing by everyone, thus universally true - having-not-to-be. (Besides: if there would be objective, non-experiential as-if-suffering and as-if-ending-desire, would its avoidance really be more important than the avoidance of an experienced, intolerable suffering?)
Consequently, I claim (opposing Hume's guillotine): from some things - desires - that are, it can be inferred, how things should be - since desires are shalling-be.
Even here, someone may point out: We don't call an action or state-of-affairs wrong or shalling-not-be solely because someone wants to avoid or aims at avoiding the action or state-of-affairs in question.
The avoidance of the action or state-of-affairs must also have a reason - that the action or state is bad, unpleasant.
I consider this a mere academic question - I claim, that in any case, where someone wants to avoid some state-of-affairs, she feels it as unpleasant. And any time, when someone wants to experience or possess something, she feels it to be pleasant. The classification of wrong and right can still be grounded on desires.
I still claim, opposing Hume's guillotine: How things should be, can be inferred from how some things are.
David Hume wrote in A Treatise of Human Nature (p. 409):
"I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprized to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, or is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or ought not. This change is imperceptible; but it is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason."
Hume's guillotine is often understood to mean: Thereof, that people factually (mostly) act in a certain way - that something is "natural" - cannot be deduced, that we should act like this. In this sense even I find Hume's guillotine valid.
However, Hume's guillotine can also be understood more generally: what should be, cannot be deduced from anything that is. This claim I want to disprove in this presentation.
Hume has also written something like this (still Treatise... p. 408): we cannot perceive the wrongness of any action in the action itself or its consequences - only in our own disapproval. Hume obviously thought, that good, evil, right or wrong don't exist outside the mind of the (any) moral judge.
My view is, then, that moral wrongness (or wrong-makers) exist also in other's desires. To repeat: from how some things ie. desires are, can be deduced, how things ought/must be - since desires are having-to-be.
My claim can still be opposed: we don't factually use language like this. If someone else wants an action or its consequences not to prevail, we don't automatically call this the having-not-to-be of the action. But when someone else wants this, it must at least be admitted, that there is an importance of not-performing the action - sometimes a compelling desire ie. compelling importance. Moral wrongness and having-to-be (obligation) can be grounded on desires.
My claim seems still to entail problems. If everything, that someone wants, must be realized, it is possible, that someone wants a state-of-affairs X to come into being/continue, and someone else to stay nonprevalent/end. A situation S can, that is, be both wrong and required (obligatory). Isn't it logically impossible, that something is both wrong and non-wrong?
I defend myself: It is quite possible, that towards a state-of-affairs is directed both a wrong-maker - an ending-desire - and an obligatory-maker - a realizaton-desire. In this way, S is both wrong and required. We are not used to both-wrong-and-right-claims in moral discussions, but I find, that we have reason to get used to them.
How to apply in practice?
I admit, that there are still practical problems. Of what use is a both-and -moral belief in practice? If state-of-affairs S is both wrong and obligatory, should we aim at its extinction/keeping away or its conservation/creation?
I answer: if everything, that someone wants, is obligatory, then a state-of-affairs, that someone wants more - more intensely - than someone else its opposite, is more requirable (obligatory). (The desire of one's suffering to end, that is associated with extreme suffering, would seem to be one of the most intense desires.)
But it is possible to imagine a situation, where person A - a sadist - compellingly wants to cause pain to person B and experiences extreme sufffering, if not allowed to do so. Let us assume, that person B, too, would experience extreme suffering, when person A was tormenting her. Which desire should we take as a guiding principle: the sadist's desire to torment or the non-suffering-desire of the (potential) victim?
By the principle that I advocate, the fulfilment of both desires is equally important. It would seem, that whichever desire we obey, the result is (partly) wrong. But common sense would seem to say: one way to solve the conflict between desire and reality is to exterminate the desire, possibly by means of psychotherapy. Besides: if the law would condone sadistic tormenting, the trust between people would weaken, which would damage many kinds of social relations, that make life better (better in accordance with desires).
Motivation of rights, roughly
To return to my basic principles: everything, that someone or something compellingly wants, must be realized - there is a must-be of its realization - or the desire must be exterminated. Consequently, it is of no importance, whether the desirer is a human or another animal - or a machine. All desirers have the right to what they want - the desired must be realized in one way or another, with the aid of moral agents if not without. We should (must) take care of the fulfilment of as many desires as possible - principally the most intense desires.
The stance, according to which non-human animals are as desiring and suffering as humans, has been defended by many writers better than I am capable of. I only quote Donald Griffin (Eläimellinen nautinto ((=Animal pleasure?)), 2006, p. 43), briefly:
"Nature may find it more effective to give life forms a small amount of consciousness than to try to equip every animal with an ability to react mechanically to all possible situations." By "a small amount of consciousness" Griffin means, I presume, the ability to enjoy and suffer, desires, and a learning ability.
It is impossible to prove indisputably the existence of the desires ans suffering of non-human animals, but this also applies to the desires and suffering of other humans. Notwithstanding, I would deem it best to adhere to some kind of carefulness principle. After all, it would be terrible to cause suffering to someone or something due to uncertainty. (There would then exist a terribleness!)
Whom to aid primarily: largest number or most intense sufferers?
I propose one more practical conclusion. I claim, that the extinction of intense suffering of one subject is more important than the extinction of milder suffering of many.
Let us assume, that the scale of suffering begins with 0, which represents full contentment (extreme pleasure) and ends with 10, which represents the most intolerable suffering.
Let us now imagine a starting situation, where one subject has the suffering-value of 8 (intense suffering) and five subjects a suffering-value of of 2 (mild discomfort). Let us now consider two development patterns: a) the suffering-value of all five "2-sufferers" is turned into 0 (flawless happiness) and the 8-suffering is left as it is b) the one "8-suffering" is turned into 6 and the "2-sufferers" experiences are left as they are.
In the development pattern a) the wrongness of the whole hasn't diminished from the starting point. It is still wrong with the intensity of eight; there is a wrongness of eight. In the development b) there is no greater wrongness than six, so it is less wrong.
The suffering-values of the different experiencers are not to be added to each other in order to see, how many extreme must-not-be-experiences they make together (how many extreme sufferings have been avoided). After all, mild sufferings don't factually come together and make one more intense suffering. The situation, that includes the largest single suffering-value, is the most wrong*.
We are to (must) help, above all, the individuals that feel the most intense suffering, whether humans or other animals. (I wonder which is the more intense suffering: the suffering of a production animal over not being able to move freely or keep her young to herself, or the suffering of a human not being allowed to "tpamper herself" with cheese or the like?)
Alternatively we must create conditions, where the individuals in question are able to help themselves - let animals live in their natural habitat** and teach children to be able to help themselves and solve their own problems.
* If sufferings don't factually come together as stronger sufferings, doesn't it also entail: Helping five 10-sufferers is no more (better) than helping one? I claim not. If I have made one 10-sufferer (relatively) happy, there still is a thousand 10-sufferers - and importances that they be helped. The more that are helped, the better.
** This is a better alternative considering, that research about the desires and suffering-causes of a certain species doesn't necessarily reveal the differences between the individuals of the species. And because, if most animal (also human) individuals take care of their happiness by themselves, humans can focus on helping those, who are unable to do this. (This would seem to make possible the relative happiness of a larger amount of individuals than other alternatives allow.)
Defence against a misunderstanding
I might still clarify one point. I have sometimes been understood to mean, by "wrong", something on which an avoiding-desire is directed. This is a misunderstanding.
As far as I can see, "morally wrong" means something, that is in some way universally truly having-not-to-be. And the having-not-to-be of a situation can be universally true in case an avoidance-desire is directed to it.
That is, an avoidance-desire is one possible truth-condition (or truth-maker?*) - and the only fulfilled truth-condition, that I am able to observe in the world. Another possible truth-condition would be, that there is an objective, non-experiential expectation of avoiding something, but this we are not able to perceive.
I repeat: I don't mean by "wrong" (only) something that is aimed at avoiding, but wrongness can be true on the strength that someone wants to avoid the situation in question.
* Rather a "truth-maker", if "truth-condition" means the only allowed condition for the truth of a sentence or belief.
-In more detail, I deliberate these issues in an older blog text, "Facts of right and wrong II", august ((elo)) 2016.
Still one meaning of "wrong"
In this text I left undiscussed another, perhaps essential meaning of "wrong". "Wrong" may mean, besides away-willed or aimed-to-end, also bad. I'm beginning to suspect,that we usually mean by "wrong" some so (maybe objectively?) bad, unpleasant action or situation, that anyone who sees its badness, cannot be content with its prevalence, but wants it to end. Perhaps we consider badness alone to make something wrong?
